Employment Situation, December 2016

The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Labor Department issued its monthly Employment Situation  this morning at 8:30 est.

According to the release, the economy gained 156,000 new jobs in December, more than enough to absorb new entrants into the workforce.  Revisions to October figures were -7,000 jobs, to November’s, +26,000, meaning the net revision to the prior two months’ data was +19,000 new positions.

While this is a so-so result, we should consider how much may be due to random statistical variations in the data and, more importantly, how much comes from the difficulty employers are apparently having in finding qualified candidates who are currently unemployed.

More evidence that the latter is becoming a more significant issue comes from the rising trend in average hourly wages the BLS is also reporting.  for the 12 months ending in December, wages have been increasing at an inflation-beating 2.9% rate.  If we, methodologically incorrectly, take the December wage gains alone, the year on year increase is 4.6%.

The bottom line:  good news, and evidence the Fed will likely take as prompting it to raise the Fed Funds rate again sooner rather than later.

is 4% real GDP growth possible in the US?

the 3% – 4% growth promise

One of Donald Trump’s campaign promises is to create 3% – 4% GDP growth in the US.  Is this possible?

The first thing to note is that this is real GDP growth, meaning after inflation has been subtracted out.  I’m not sure Mr. Trump has ever clarified this–or that he wouldn’t be nonplussed by the question–but his appointees to head the Treasury and Commerce departments have said real is what they mean.  Also, 4% nominal (that is, including inflation) growth is about what the US has been churning out in recent years.  So promising 4% nominal growth would be like P T Barnum putting up his “This way to the egress” sign.

where does growth come from?

Simple models are usually the best (as in this case, feeling embarrassed when calling them “models” is a good indicator of simplicity).  Growth can come either by having more people working or by having workers be more productive, meaning churning out more output per hour.

more workers

Having more people working is a function of demographics.

Each year, the population of the US rises by about 0.8%.  Half of that comes from children being born to people already residing in the US; half comes from immigration.  If we take increases in the population as a proxy for increases in the workforce, then demographics can generate a bit less than 1% trend growth in GDP.

This also means that if Mr. Trump carries through on his threat to deport 3% of the workforce and restrict entry of immigrants, not only will the social consequences be shameful, he will make it that much harder to achieve his GDP objective.


Given that demographics will likely either not change, or will change in a negative way, getting to the low end of the 3% – 4% range will only be possible if worker productivity rises.   Let’s make the optimistic assumptions that the Republicans’ white supremacy rhetoric doesn’t discourage any potential immigrants and that there’s no increase in deportations.  If so, productivity gains would have to be at least +2.2% per year to achieve the low end of the GDP growth goal.

If +4% growth isn’t simply “marketing” in the worst sense of that word, the Trump camp must believe that productivity can be boosted to +3.2% per year.

An aside:  My first stock market boss was a vintage 19th-century capitalist.  He believed that increasing worker productivity meant boosting the workload–and making employees work longer hours for the same pay.  (No, there was no company store where we were forced to buy meals; yes, we had to basically provide our own office supplies.)

That’s not correct, though.  Productivity improvement comes through better employee education/training and by employers investing in labor-enhancing machines (back then, it would have been computer workstations, or in my firm’s case, pencils).

productivity today

Productivity today has been stuck at around +1% per year growth for about a decade.  During the housing bubble, when the US was furiously churning out many more new dwellings than the country could afford and banks were making crazy no-documentation mortgage loans (websites were also sprouting up to show low-income renters how to buy a house and scam the system for a year of “free rent” before foreclosure), we got to maybe +2.8% for a number of years.  But the last time the US rose above 3% was in the 1950s, when industry in Europe and Japan had been destroyed by war.

my take

I hope Wilbur Ross can do what he says.

I think +4% growth is simply hype–and that Mr. Ross, if not Mr. Trump, knows the situation.

The trend in manufacturing is to replace humans with robots. That’s the most straightforward way to achieve productivity gains. Output climbs steadily; output per worker goes up faster.  However, the number of employees shrinks drastically.   For many displaced workers supporting Mr. Trump, this may be a case of being careful about what you wish for.






current Japanese inflation? ..there is none

Deflation means that prices in general are falling.  If this is the case, it’s better to put off buying new things for as long as possible, until they’re 100% absolutely needed.  That’s because anything you buy today will be cheaper tomorrow.

After a while, non-consumption becomes a habit, and an economy stagnates.

Conversely, in an inflationary environment, everything is more expensive tomorrow than it is today.  So consumers buy in advance.  In addition to things they need, they may also purchase items they have no intention of consuming.  They may think that keeping physical objects which they can later resell is a better way of preserving or enhancing purchasing power than keeping savings in the bank.

Japan has been in a deflationary economic funk for over a quarter century.   When Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister of Japan in late 2012, he decided to attack deflation as a way of boosting economic growth.  He had a plan that has become famous for its three “arrows”:  a massive depreciation of the yen, large-scale government deficit spending, and corporate/regulatory reform.  Each of the three should have been enough by itself to spark inflation.

The expense of the plan has been enormous, both in terms of the loss of international purchasing power of yen-denominated assets and in increased national debt.

The result after close to four years?   ….as the Tokyo government reported last week, no inflation at all.

How can this be?

From its outset, I’ve believed that Abenomics would be unsuccessful.  I thought the stumbling block would be corporate reform.  The earliest evidence that would indicate I would be wrong would, I thought/think, take the form of an effort to remove the legislative barriers to reform that the Liberal Democrats in the Diet had installed after the deflationary crisis had already begun.  So far, for all practical purposes there’s been nada.  So I continue to be convinced that corporate leaders will resist any changes to the status quo, aided as they are by the Diet’s removal of any levers to force reform from the outside.

Of course, any inflation-induced oomph to consumption won’t last forever.  People and institutions adjust. If nothing else, consumers run out of storage space for the extra stuff they’ve bought.  They then have to throttle back their spending   …or rent a storage unit  …or contemplate a McMansion.

What’s surprising to me, however, is that the same reluctance to spend–although perhaps not to the same degree–is evident in both the US and in Europe.  We might figure that the austerity approach of EU countries wouldn’t exactly spur consumers on.  But the lack of inflation and the paucity of mall-storming or website-crashing consumption in the US after eight years of extraordinary stimulus seem to argue that the overarching economic theories about how to induce inflation are incorrect.

Demographics as the cause?


the Employment Situation, September 2016

At 8:30 edt this morning, the Bureau of Labor Statistics released  monthly Employment Situation report for September.

The ES estimates the US economy created +156,000 new positions last month.  While enough to absorb the average number of people leaving school and entering the job market for the first time, the figure is below the average of +192,000 jobs created over the past three months.  Revisions to the prior two months’ estimates were also negative, subtracting a total of -7,000 from prior tallies.

For what it’s worth (not much, in my opinion), labor economists had been predicting the figure would come in at +172,000.

It’s important to remember, though, that the unemployment figures are the result of subtracting the number of job gainers from the number of job leavers.  The monthly figure for each is around 3.5 million; the difference between the two is statistically significant only +/- 100,000.

Positives in the report:  wages continue to rise at 2.6% annually; employment in the mining industry, which includes oil and gas, may be bottoming after two years of decline.


The real significance of the September ES is in its inoffensiveness.  There’s nothing in it that could even remotely be considered as a check on the Fed’s desire to raise short-term interest rates before yearend.




the September 7th Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) report

The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Labor Department released its latest JOLTS report on Wednesday.

The main results:

–nationwide job openings are now at 5.9 million, the highest figure in the 16 year history of the report.  This is substantially above the 4.5 million level of 2006-07.

–the rate of new hires has been flat for about two years at just over 5 million monthly.  While this is 5% – 10% below the rate of 2006-07, the very high number of job openings would have been consistent with an unemployment rate of 3% ten years ago.  This seems to me to be a point in favor of the idea that the main impediment to filling jobs is finding workers with needed skills.

–3 million workers are voluntarily leaving their jobs monthly.  This is a sign they’re confident of finding employment again without much difficulty.  That’s back to the pre-recession levels of 2006, and almost double the recession lows.

All of this argues that the US is at or near full employment.  On the other hand, however, there’s little sign of the upward pressure on wages that this situation would have produced in the past.


Whatever the reason for slow-rising wages, it seems to me there’s no reason in the employment figures for the Fed to maintain anything near the current emergency-room-low level of short-term interest rates.



more on productivity

Last Friday, Jim Paulsen, a strategist from Wells Fargo whose work I like, gave an interview with CNBC about productivity.  His take: US productivity is being substantially understated.

The interview contains an interesting chart–one well worth checking out–in which Mr. Paulsen tracks a measure of wage growth with one of productivity.  Historically, the two have moved in tandem  …until 2012.  At that time wage growth begins to accelerate …and productivity starts to drop like a stone.

His argument is that if the productivity figures are as bad as they look, employers would never be raising wages at anything like the rate they are.

To get his results, Mr. Paulsen has had to do two things:  he uses real (meaning after inflation is subtracted) wage growth and productivity; and he uses deviation from trend (sort of like a rate of change) rather than the wage and productivity figures themselves.

As a general rule, I don’t like charts (because you can manipulate the axes to add or subtract drama), and I worry when the key relationships are in derivative data.  Still, I think the Paulsen argument is right.  Wages are rising in a way that strongly suggests there’s something wrong with the official productivity calculations.

why productivity matters

This morning the Labor department issued its report for 2Q16 on productivity and costs.  The release shows that productivity in the US dropped for the third quarter in a row, coming in at -0.5% at an annual rate.

Why does this matter?

what productivity is

Productivity is a measure of the amount of output the average worker produces in a given period of time.  The government gets its aggregate figure by dividing its estimate of real output during a period by its estimate of total hours worked.

why it’s important

In broad terms, GDP can grow in two ways.  Either there can be more people working to make stuff, or workers can become more productive, that is, make more output per unit of time.

Worker productivity is not boosted by exhorting employees to make superhuman efforts from 9 to 5, as at least one of my former bosses firmly believed.  Instead, productivity increases come either from capital investment that provides workers with better tools or from workers getting training/education that allows them to work smarter.

consider Japan,

the poster child for advanced country GDP dysfunction.  The domestic workforce there is shrinking by about 0.7% per year.  So the country has to increase the productivity of existing workers by the same amount simply to prevent GDP from falling!

If we assume that continuing capital investment can increase productivity by 1.0% a year, which for Japan would be saying a lot, the country is locked into at best a miniscule 0.3% long-term annual GDP growth rate.  In other words, it is perpetually teetering on the edge of recession.

There’s no evidence of any increase in the Japanese birth rate;  in fact, it has been going in the other direction for a long time.  One obvious solution to stagnation is to allow immigration.  However, Japan has a xenophobic aversion to admitting foreign workers.  It’s opposed to allowing women having a significant role in corporations, too.   So it remains stuck in the same economic rut it has been in since 1990.

as for the US…

Just as the shoot-yourself-in-the-foot actions of the Japanese central bank in dealing with that country’s first decades (tightening policy too soon and nipping recovery in the bud), its response to its demographic dilemma should also be a cautionary tale for the EU and, ultimately, for the US.  In both areas, the same demographic forces are at work, though at a less advanced stage–and with the work force younger in the US than in the EU.

measurement problems?

In the early days of the personal computer era, productivity statistics showed the same kind of lackluster progression that they are exhibiting at present.  That turned out to be a problem with how productivity was being measured.  Maybe the same will turn out to be the case with the technological change the internet is bringing.  Or it may be that in creative destruction, the second part comes first.

a practical application

The long-term growth rate of the US economy is now about 2%, comprised in roughly equal parts of growth of the workforce and productivity increases. The Republican economic platform maintains that the GDP growth rate of the US can be doubled by:

–lowering the number of foreign workers who can enter the US and compelling, say, 5% of the current workforce to leave the country, and

–reintroducing obsolete 1970-era tools to American factories, attempting to create a domestic market for output by placing high tariffs on imports of modern products.

I’m not sure how fewer workers + older equipment = growth.  More immigration + worker training/retraining might be better.