End game for growth stocks: nasty, brutish but not very short. How does AAPL fit the mold?

the growth stock life cycle, in brief

The Wall Street cliché is that the key to successful growth investing is how skillfully you sell the stock (as opposed to value investing, where the key is how you buy it).

The idea is that most growth stocks have a very short life in the stock market sun–five or so years.  The best growth companies continue to reinvent themselves and create new lines of business–as WMT or MSFT did.  But most aren’t able to.

As the company demonstrates surprisingly strong earnings growth, the stock market attitude gradually changes from one of disbelief to fandom–extrapolating the period of superior profit expansion much farther into the future than will likely pan out.  This tendency shows itself in a huge price earnings multiple–both absolute and relative to the rest of the market.

Normally, the seeds of future earnings disappointment–and consequent price earning multiple contraction–are already being sown in a qualitative sense at least.  But many investors ignore, or explain away, these early warning signs even when they begin to be evident in reported earnings.  At some point, disillusionment, and subsequent underperformance, begins.

MSFT as an example

MSFT is a good example of this phenomenon.  In the four years from 1995 to 2000, MSFT’s reported profits per share grew at a 40% annual rate,  meaning they quadrupled over that span.  The price earnings multiple expanded from 29 to 53, and advance of 83%, over the same period.  Therefore, more than two fifths of the total 10x stock gain came from p/e expansion.

Over the subsequent decade, MSFT’s eps grew at a little more than a 10% clip–and the stock’s p/e contracted steadily from 53 to 13 (or 3.5x the market average multiple to .9x currently).  Despite the doubling in earnings the  stock price has been cut in half, more than all of which is due to p/e contraction.

If we look at MSFT in general conceptual terms, the stock was first driven by the acceptance of the MS-DOS operating system, then by the Office suite, and finally by successive iterations of the Windows graphical user interface–all in an expanding PC market.  Then the market for its products matured, MSFT came late to the Internet, its diversifications earned little money and…  Nevertheless, it’s important to note that MSFT lasted as a growth stock for such an unusually long period because of its successive waves of innovation from MS-DOS on, not just because the PC market was growing quickly.

How does AAPL fit this model?

Looking in the most general terms, AAPL was a moribund personal computer firm with a cult-like following among individuals using PCs that had a change of management.  New leadership introduced a portable music player, the iPod, that was so successful it quickly doubled the size of the company.  AAPL subsequently introduced a revolutionary smartphone, the iPhone, which again doubled the size of the company.  Now it’s introducing a third product, the iPad in a hope of doing the same trick again.

What AAPL has done over the past decade is truly remarkable.  Earnings per share have grown at a 60%+ annual rate, and are now 10x what they were in 2005. The company is now one part PCs, one part iPod, and two parts iPhone, three of which weren’t there five years ago.

Two potential questions about AAPL’s future performance have emerged:

–One is the “concept” observation that to have the same positive effect on the overall company as the iPhone has had, the next product, presumably the iPad, has to be twice the size of the iPhone.  This is just a fact of the company’s recent growth.

–Android phones are emerging as a potential competitor to the iPhone; iPod unit sales are slipping; Chrome-based tablets are potentially going to be on the market for this year’s holiday season.  Wall Street is presumably thinking that Chrome products will end up being a case of the Zune redux.

one big difference

In 2005, AAPL’s stock was trading at 26x earnings per share.  Today, after a period of extraordinary earnings growth, AAPL’s stock is trading at under 17x eps, a pe multiple contraction of 30%.  AAPL’s relative pe was 1.4 in 2005.  It’s 1.1 now.

Unlike the typical growth stock, more than 100% of AAPL’s stock performance has been driven by earnings growth.  The pe contraction means investors have been increasingly forcefully betting that the company can’t continue its present rate of expansion.  In fact, one might argue that a pe multiple of 17- means the market thinks AAPL won’t grow earnings by more than 15% from now on.

my thoughts

Personally, I think tablets will create a new revolution in computer usage.  I’m not sure the AAPL will get the market share with the iPad that it has been able to achieve with the iPhone or the iPod.  Still, if my reading of the stock price dynamics is correct, I think Wall Street is being much too pessimistic about AAPL’s prospects.  Hard as this is to say about a stock that has had 15x the market return over the past five years, that’s what the numbers tell me.

“search neutrality” –Google’s newest challenge? the ITA acquisition

Everybody is by now familiar with the topic of net neutrality.  This is the question of whether the owners of high-speed transmission networks for internet traffic have the right to regulate the flow of data, assigning some information to what is in effect the slow lane while allowing other content to barrel ahead in express.

This issue still hasn’t been fully dealt with.  As I posted in April, the FCC ordered Comcast to stop interfering with traffic through BitTorrent, a peer-to-peer file-sharing service that the ISP claimed was using up too much bandwidth.  Comcast sued, on grounds that the FCC didn’t have the authority to issue it such an order–and won.

The FCC responded by moving to reclassify Comcast as a public utility, like phone companies ATT or Verizon, so that it would have the regulatory authority it needed.  This opens a whole political can of worms, however, so it’s still not clear where matters stand.

GOOG’s ITA purchase

The wheel of competition has recently taken a turn in a different, but related, direction with Google’s agreement to buy ITA Software, founded by MIT scientists and now held by private equity, for $700 million.  ITA makes the airline database search software that powers the air part of travel sites for online agencies like Kayak and Orbitz, as well as for the online sales sites of Continental Air.

GOOG’s isn’t the first purchase of this type.  Two years ago, MSFT paid $115 million for the smaller private company Farecast, which is at the heart of MSFT’s Bing Travel service.  But ITA is bigger and already services significant third-party customers.

unhappy campers

Not everyone is happy with this development–especially not Barry Diller, CEO of online travel agent (and former MSFT subsidiary) Expedia.  He’s worried that if/when it acquires ITA, GOOG will promote its own services over those of EXPE.

This assumes, of course, that GOOG will follow MSFT’s lead and create a travel site similar to Bing Travel.  That may well happen.  In paid search, a prospective GOOG Travel could outbid everyone else for keywords, since this would just be transferring revenue from one GOOG pocket (travel) to another (search).  It’s not so clear that would happen in any unfair manner in unpaid search.  The reputational, and legal, risk to GOOG is too high, I think, for that to occur.

EXPE isn’t out of the woods by any means, however–in my opinion.  It’s possible that the combination of GOOG and ITA professionals will produce new travel software that’s significantly better than anything on the market today.  Maybe ITA can do this alone, with GOOG financial support.

Suppose that instead of using ITA software itself  GOOG offers it for free to any travel site that is willing to allow GOOG advertising on it. This is basically what it did with cellphone operating system software.   That would give any takers a 10%-15% cost advantage over sites which either develop their own travel software or buy it from third parties.  It would also make it easier for new firms to enter the market.  Any way you look at is, GOOG offering ITA for free would  lower the value of any database technology that a company like EXPE holds.

That’s Mr. Diller’s real problem, I think.  If so, he can’t just say this–that there’s something wrong with a new market entrant turning up with better, lower-cost technology.  Search neutrality may be the best weapon he has to fight with.

AAPL vs. GOOG: battle of the titans (II)

Judging by their stock charts, Wall Street has pretty much conceded the battle to AAPL.  In fact, there isn’t much doubt at all.  Since the ipo of GOOG in 2004, AAPL is up about 12x.  GOOG is up 4x–and that includes a big jump after an unusual, and less than successful, ipo in which GOOG tried to market itself directly to investors, cutting out Wall Street investment banks.

Yes, the S&P is just about flat over that span, so both are big winners.  And, yes, AAPL is starting from a low base in 2004, a point when some questioned its survival.  But the big separation between the two names has come between the beginning of 2007 and now, a time period when AAPL tripled and GOOG has been flat.

AAPL has also pulled significantly ahead in simple balance sheet metrics like working capital or accumulated cash holdings.  The balance sheet number read as follows:

————————–12/06—————–12/09———–change

GOOG

cash                  $8.0 bill.                           $15.8 bill.                  $7.8 bill.

wc                      $8.3 bill.                           $17.9 bill.                  $9.6 bill.

AAPL

cash                  $11.9 bill.                          $24.8 bill.                $12.9 bill.

wc                     $9.4 bill.                            $20.2 bill.                 $10.8 bill.

At first glance, it looks like AAPL is pulling away from GOOG, but not opening up an insurmountable gap.  But AAPL has recently begun to divide its marketable securities into those with a life of a year or less and those with more.  The latter, $15 billion at 12/09, although cash-like, are listed as non-current assets.  Adjusting the figures, AAPL’s cash is up by $27.9 billion over the past three years, or 3.5x the cash generation of GOOG.  The main driver of this surge is the phenomenal success of the iPhone.

In addition, AAPL has set up a business, iAd, to sell iPhone ads through the apps downloaded from its store, a move calculated to fence GOOG out of the mobile ad business.  Ironically, however, the FTC has citied iAd plus AOL’s purchase of mobile ad specialist Quattro Wireless as reasons of giving the anti-trust green light to GOOG’s proposed purchase of AdMob, a Quattro rival.

The are are other signs as well, that the contest may not be so one-sided from now on.  According to the Financial Times, sales of smartphones using GOOG’s Android operating system were higher than those of the iPhone in the US market for the first three months of 2010, taking 26.6% of the market vs. 22.1% for AAPL.  Android phones were about 10% of the worldwide market over the March quarter vs. 1.6% during the year-ago period.  The gains come 40% from MSFT, the rest from everyone else.

Since the start of the year, GOOG has released version 2.1 of Android (Eclair), which increases the speed of phone apps significantly.  This week it announced version 2.2 (Froyo), which gives the operating system another big overhaul.  The following upgrade, Gingerbread, has a name and a potential release date of late this year, but no version number and few details.

Chrome os netbooks, at  one time scheduled for release during the second half of this year, appear to have dropped off the radar screen.  After the surprisingly strong sales of the iPad, they seem to have been replaced by a bevy of android-based tablets that are claimed to be hitting the market in time for the year-end holidays.

Suppose, then, that the next year or two show a reversal of trend, in which GOOG products gain market share over their AAPL counterparts?

Will this mean a significant increase in the growth rate of GOOG’s profits vs. what it is presently showing?  Only time will tell, but my guess is that it won’t.  Success of Android phones and Android tablets will allow GOOG to take its business into the mobile arena, but I think this will only erosion of revenue and profit expansion that Wall Street seems to now sense in the company.  That’s probably worth a few points of price earnings multiple expansion, however.

On the other hand, GOOG success would also have the potential to stop the momentum of the AAPL earnings freight train that is currently barreling down the tracks at an extraordinarily rapid clip.  As is the case with any growth stock, a slowing in growth from the pace the market expects has two negative effects on the stock.  It lowers the stock price by the extent to which earnings fall short of Wall Street expectations.  And it causes the price earnings multiple to contract.  This happens both as investors project forward a new, lower rate of profit advance, and as the open-ended “dream” that the stock will always surprise on the upside becomes tarnished.

For me, this means that, as stocks, AAPL has much more to lose than GOOG has to gain from Android success.

Tis is a situation to monitor closely.

tax rate, earnings per share, dividends and cash…: (II)

lots of cash

A few days ago the Financial Times ran an article pointing out the huge amounts of cash that IT companies have been piling up over the past year.  According to the newspaper, the top ten public firms in technology have added $65 billion to their cash holdings since the market bottom last March.  Together they have about a quarter-trillion dollars on their balance sheets.  The FT points to the lack of anticipated merger and acquisition activity (anti-trust?) as one reason for the accumulation, and suggests that the industry will soon begin to buy back shares to reduce the size of their holdings.

Not all the big ten are as flush as the FT makes them seem, however.  EMC, IBM and ORCL have long-term debt that pretty much offsets the cash they have.  DELL, and to a lesser extent, AMZN, are negative working capital companies.  That is, they collect money from their customers before they have to pay their suppliers.  So they enjoy a kind of “float,” the same way that a restaurant or a hotel does.  There is at least some risk to the cash that appears on the balance sheet for this reason.  If the business slows, the cash begins to disappear as suppliers are paid.

Nevertheless, there are a number of tech firms with staggering amounts of cash and little or no debt.  They include:  AAPL, GOOG, INTC, MSFT and QCOM.

an important question:  where is the money?

As I suggested in yesterday’s post, at least some of the cash is overseas.  How much, no outside observer knows.

Oddly, as I was researching the 2004 amnesty that allowed firms to repatriate money to the US without paying much tax, I found an article that suggests that six years ago, some of the companies themselves, despite their financial control software, didn’t know where the money was, either.  And some had to postpone repatriation while they upgraded their treasury departments to create a mechanism to start the process and handle the incoming money.

Would companies like another amnesty?  An academic study that I also cited yesterday suggests they would.  Professors from Duke, Michigan and Washington conducted an internet survey on this topic.  Two-thirds of respondents said they would like a repeat of the 2004 amnesty.  The median amount anticipated to be repatriated was half of current foreign cash holdings.  Most of the money sent to headquarters would come from cash balances, though some would come from added foreign borrowing. (In the next few days, I’ll post on the limits to the confidence one can have in surveying in today’s world, and in internet surveying in particular.)

Other academic research suggests that the requirement to pay income tax on repatriated earnings does motivate companies to keep large foreign balances, and even to invest the funds in projects that will not be as lucrative as competing investments in the US.

stock buybacks

I’m not a big fan.  Maybe it’s age, but I’d prefer dividend increases.  It may be more tax efficient to buy back stock.  My objection, though, is I think every company has a compensation plan that features a policy of shifting a set percentage, say, 1% a year (but a lot more for small, fast-growing firms), of the ownership of the enterprise away from its shareholders and to its management.  I’m not sure the ordinary shareholder realizes this.  And it seems to me that most stock buyback plans retire just enough stock to offset dilution from stock options–thereby keeping this part of the compensation process from becoming evident through an ever-increasing share count.

looking at the numbers

The table below lists the big tech companies with the largest amounts of net cash (= cash and marketable securities minus long-term debt).  Although, as I mentioned above, there’s no good way to tell the location of a company’s cash, the lower the tax rate the more foreign earnings–and, I think, the larger the amount of cash parked abroad.  Note that I didn’t factor in long-term investment securities.  (You have to draw the line somewhere, and I decided I wasn’t comfortable deciding about the liquidity of firms’ non-current investments.)  You may want to do this differently, and the company financials are easily available on the Edgar site.

I also show the dividend yield, if any.  The following column shows dividend payments as a percentage of free cash flow ( = cash flow minus capital spending needs).  It gives mostly “negative” information.  That is, if the percentage is high, the company has little scope to increase the dividend, or even support the current payout in bad times.  A low percentage would be a good thing for dividend seekers, if we knew the location of the cash–i.e., whether the cash is available to be paid out.

The next-to-last column shows the stock’s pe based on consensus estimates of earnings to be reported in calendar 2010.  The final column shows what the pe would be if all the foreign-generated cash were to be repatriated and tax paid in the US.

—–stock price–cash/share—–tax rate——-divd—–divd/fcf—–pe—-pe”normal”tax

AAPL      $262            $27           27%        none         n/a           19x             21x

CSCO      $27.01        $4.20        19%         none        n/a           19x             24x

GOOG      $529           $78          22%         none        n/a            21x            25x

INTC        $23.35        $2.50        30%         2.9%      35%         12.6x         13.6x

MSFT      $30.84        $3.70       26%         1.7%       33%            14x            16x

QCOM     $37.92        $7.15        17%         2.0%      38%           18x            23x

my observations

1.  The absolute amounts of cash are huge.  They were astoundingly high percentages of the firms’ stock market capitalizations at the market bottom.  But they no longer are big enough to be a primary feature of the stocks as investments, in my opinion.

2.  The group divides into two camps:  fast growers–AAPL and GOOG; and more mature companies–INTC, MSFT and QCOM.    QCOM is somewhat of an anomaly.  The other stocks declare their growth characteristics through their pes and the presence/absence of a dividend.  QCOM hasn’t expanded much during the last half-decade and pays a dividend, yet has a higher pe than either INTC or MSFT.  This is probably due to its smaller size and its focus on mobile.

3.  GOOG seems to still be a more expensive stock than AAPL, despite the year-to-date outperformance of the latter over the former by about 40 percentage points.  AAPL’s pe is lower and its growth rate higher.  GOOG’s lower tax rate suggests more earning power outside the US, but also the potential issue (perhaps non-issue to everyone except me) of tapping overseas cash.

4.  The INTC/MSFT comparison is also interesting.  They are the two stalwarts of the “Wintel alliance” of the pc era, one the hardware genius, the other the software guru.  The market worries that time has passed both firms by.

INTC has a higher dividend yield and a lower pe, which I think expresses the market’s logical preference for a software company over its more capital-intensive hardware analogue.  Wall Street also believes, I think, that MSFT has an easier migration path away from the pc to more compact internet-centric devices than INTC, which has an obvious rival in ARM Holdings plc.  On the other hand, (I think) INTC has a much stronger management than MSFT.

INTC is paying a higher portion of its free cash flow in dividends than MSFT is, but the difference is slight.  INTC also has a much higher tax rate, indicating higher potential to tap offshore cash.

I don’t own either.  If I had to buy one, I’d pick INTC–but I would also watch very closely developments with the company’s Atom chip line and how it is faring against ARM offerings.

AAPL vs. ADBE: the latest move

AAPL and ADBE used to be friends…not so much anymore, though.

Flash and the iPad

When AAPL was outlining the features of the iPad, it said it would not support ADBE’s Flash application. (It doesn’t for the iPhone, either.)  Steve Jobs called Flash “buggy.”   AAPL strongly implied, if it didn’t state outright, that Flash was too antiquated to be permitted on a “magical” machine like the iPad.

This may well be true.  But I can’t help but notice that the ban on Flash forces iPad users to depend on AAPL for delivery of video content.  That, in turn, means that AAPL gets the chance to collect a transmission fees–either from the content provider or the user.  (Note, also, that there are no ports on the iPad to let you plug in a peripheral and import content that way.  Hmm.)

That’s the past, however.

the iPhone and Creative Suite 5

ADBE is just about to release a new version of its important product, Creative Suite.  One of its interesting new features is a kind of translation or porting gizmo that takes output created using Flash and reconfigures it so it works on other devices, including the iPhone and iPad.

The Wall Street Journal reports today that last week AAPL changed its rules for what can appear on the iPhone or iPad to ban content, like that coming from Creative Suite’s new gizmo, that isn’t originally written using AAPL-approved software–whether it works on AAPL devices or not.

Why would AAPL do this?  According to the WSJ, when it asked, AAPL replied that “Adobe’s Flash is closed and proprietary,” whereas AAPL (only) supports standard technologies.  Huh?

This is what I think

Let’s take it for granted that the standard that AAPL wants used, HTML5, is more advanced and produces a better image–and not just that the ATT mobile network and the AAPL device microprocessors/batteries aren’t big enough to handle Flash.  This is not at all clear to me, but let’s just say.

If I’m a smartphone app designer, the ADBE gizmo gives me a way to develop my product in Flash and port it over to the AAPL standard for free.  Three consequences:

–I’m going to develop in Flash and port over my product to any other platform I can,

–therefore, I’m not going to use any great new features of HTML5, and

–all smartphones are going to have identical products from me.

This would be a pro-GOOG result, since an Android phone would have access to any new app at the same time as the iPhone does.  It would also orient competition in smartphones away from unique features and toward price.

By refusing to allow this procedure, and in the absence of a gizmo to port content from HTML5 to Flash, the app developer has to choose–between AAPL, which has a ton of phones already in use, and Android, which doesn’t.  Not a hard decision.  The result?–the iPhone retains unique content and Android has that much farther to go to catch up.

The situation is the opposite for the iPad, since that device has just been launched.  Technical limitations of the iPad aside, you’d think AAPL should be encouraging developers to provide content.  Yes, but the iPhone represents half of AAPL’s profits, so any help to making the iPad more desirable is far outweighed by potential harm to the iPhone.

the outcome?

It’s not clear year.  Watch for a response from GOOG.