the Blue Apron (APRN) offering

Meal delivery service APRN (originally named Petridish Media) went public yesterday at an offering price of $10 per share through an underwriting syndicate led by Goldman Sachs.

The original pricing range was reportedly $15 – $17, but was reduced to $10 – $11 after Amazon and Whole Foods announced their intention to merge.

The stock traded as high as $11 yesterday, before fading back to the offering price later in the day.  I didn’t watch the stock and there’s surprisingly little price information from yesterday’s trading available this morning, but it seems as if the underwriters made few (if any) “stabilizing” purchases at $10 to keep the stock from closing below the offering quote.

Today APRN opened at $9.98, slipped to $9.50, and is trading at around $9.70 or so as I’m writing this.

Although I have zero interest in owning APRN at this point, I think it’s an interesting issue from a number of perspectives:

–the concept is, I think, for APRN to be the “first mover” in home meal kit delivery.  Doing so would give it brand recognition and scale that rivals starting up later would find difficult to match.  Whether APRN can achieve this position remains to be seen

–as I read the prospectus (meaning: I find it hard to believe what I’ve read), 100% of the proceeds from the offering are going to the company.  None of the VC backers or otheer insiders are cashing out any portion of their positions.  If so, this is either very good (they think APRN is a gold mine) or not so much (they don’t want to scare away buyers)

–APRN is an “emerging growth company,” listing under the provisions of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS).  JOBS allows early-stage companies to go public without meeting all the SEC-mandated disclosure requirements for public companies.  This makes the financials hard to interpret.  Still, it seems to me that there may be a serious deterioration in APRN’s working capital during 1Q17

–the main metrics/issues for APRN are the cost of acquiring a customer and its ability to retain one once acquired.  Again, it’s hard to get a good read, but Wall Street’s apparent worry–apart from AMZN/WFM–is that the answers to these questions are “high” and “low.”

All in all, the risks of APRN are too high for me, but this will be an informative one to watch.





accredited investors and the JOBS Act

“accredited” investors

When you open a brokerage account in the US, you fill out a form that requests information about your income, risk tolerances and investment knowledge.  From what I can see, it gets only superficial scrutiny.  But saying that you have some money and understand the risks of investing in various types of publicly traded securities does two things.  It gets you a seat at the table and it protects your broker from customer lawsuits claiming they lost money because they didn’t understand what they were getting into.  In a sense, passing this vetting process makes you accredited–but that’s not what the term “accredited” usually means.

Instead, it refers to the same kind of vetting process, but for private placements–purchases of securities not registered with the SEC and not sold through the traditional (expensive and time-consuming) IPO process carried out by the big brokerage houses.

For individuals, “accredited” means you have $1 million in assets, not including your principal residence, or you earn at least $200,000 a year.  (There’s a different criterion for institutional investors who want to trade in non-registered–usually foreign–securities.  To be accredited in that sense means having $100 million in investable funds under management.)

The bottom line:  “accredited” means either you’re in the top 1% or pretty close.

not good enough for the 21st century

In the pre-internet, pre-JOBS Act, pre-Mary Jo White world, that was ok.  Private placements were restricted to a very small number of individuals, whose main characteristic is that they can afford losses they might incur in buying risky securities.  The wealth criterion also effectively preserved the near-monopoly on public issuance of securities of the big brokerage houses on Wall Street.

That’s all changing.

the new order

There are already special rules to allow crowdfunding sales of securities.

For the JOBS Act (which allows smaller, early stage companies to raise funds with only limited disclosure) to be truly effective as a  capital raising vehicle for business startups, the pool of investors has got to be larger than just the usual “accredited” suspects.

Interestingly, at the same time as the newly active SEC is saying it sees some merit in things like bitcoin, the agency is also preparing to overhaul the definition of what an accredited investor is.

The new emphasis appears to be on accrediting people who have knowledge, training or experience that gives them insight into the risks and rewards of investing in a startup rather than just being able to take their lumps if an investment goes south.

I don’t know whether this is a good thing or not.

But Washington passed the JOBS Act last year to make it much easier for startups to raise money.  And, contrary to Mary Shapiro’s foot dragging, Mary Jo White is certainly going to set rules of procedure to allow the Act to function.  And that means opening this class of investments to more potential buyers.

do think, however, that this will turn out to be another instance of a new internet-based business model undermining an older higher-cost pre-internet one.  It will be interesting to see how–and if traditional brokerage/investment banking firms will adapt.  I suspect that this change will have far greater ripple effects than anyone now expects–maybe even momentous ones.


the SEC says issuers of private securities, like hedge funds, can now advertise their wares

SEC disclosure 

The SEC has very specific rules that limit what a company can say, either about itself or about the securities it’s selling, when it’s in the process of issuing stocks or bonds.

The securities of some companies aren’t subject to general SEC oversight,  either because the firms are tiny or the securities are being sold only to a small group of supposedly savvy buyers.  In such cases, the SEC rules have been, basically, that the firm can say nothing publicly.  In particular, the issuing company can’t solicit interest from the general public or advertise its offerings in ways the general public might see–like in newspapers or on the internet.

a rule change

That changed last year when Congress passed the JOBS (Jumpstart Our Business Startups) Act.  This legislation requires the SEC to take back the regulations that bar solicitation and advertising by issuers of non-regulated securities.  Mary Shapiro, former head of the SEC, decided this was a bad idea and didn’t comply.  The current chairman, Mary Jo White, has followed the Congressional directive and removed them.

Yes, Ms. White had no legal choice…

…but is this a good idea?

At first blush, it would seem that it isn’t.  After all, the consensus is that the JOBS Act, by eliminating the requirement for many issuers to offer audited financial statements to potential buyers, is an open invitation to fraud.

Washington is the same crew that repealed the Glass-Steagall Act in the late 1990s, allowing commercial banks to reenter businesses they helped cause the Great Depression with–and which they promptly used to help cause the Great Recession that we’re still digging ourselves out of.

In this case, the glaring issue is that there’s lots of evidence that significant numbers of hedge funds misstate in their marketing materials their investment performance, their professional qualifications and the size of their assets under management.  It doesn’t take a genius to guess what side of the ledger the misstatements fall on.  (Search PSI for my posts on hedge funds.  If you read one, maybe it should be about an NYU study.)

Why would hedge funds change their stripes when selling to a much wider group of individual investors.

accredited investors

Yes, issuers are supposed to sell the bulk of their offerings to “accredited” investors.  But that only means that buyers are supposed to have either:

–net worth of at least $1 million, excluding the value of a primary residence, or

–income of $200,000 in each of the past two years, with prospects of the same in the current year ($300,000 for couples).

That doesn’t mean they know anything about finance.

maybe it is

But there may be a method to the apparent madness.

Ms. White seems to be drawing a sharp distinction between the character of the buyer of a private offering (supposedly sophisticated parties, who are outside SEC purview) and the disclosure materials relating to it.

Because the offering documents have so far been disseminated only to qualified buyers, the SEC had no say over their accuracy. That was up to the buyer to judge.  Now, thanks to the JOBS Act, these materials can be disseminated to everybody, whether “accredited” or not.  The issuer subsequently screens potential buyers to ensure they meet the accreditation criteria before he allows them to purchase.

The SEC is asserting that the wider dissemination gives the agency jurisdiction over the accuracy of the materials.  It is preparing rules it intends to have issuers of private securities follow.

It may turn out that the JOBS Act has accidentally given the SEC another weapon in addition to prosecution for illegal insider trading in its fight to clean up the hedge fund industry.

the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS) and Manchester United


Earlier this year, over the strong objections of the SEC and knowledgeable financial industry observers, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act.  As the acronym JOBS suggests, the avowed purpose of the act is to “increase American job creation and economic growth…”

The basic thrust of the act is to waive, for any firm with annual revenue under $1 billion,  SEC requirements that a company seeking to go public have strong internal financial controls and audited financial statements.

Another way to describe this kind of legislation is as a “race to the bottom,”  where countries try to boost their domestic investment banking industry by seeing who can loosen listing standards the most.  Thereby, the “winning” country attracts the largest amount of new listings.

Why we want to give investment banks a shot in the arm is a mystery to me.  You might ask Representative Stephen Fincher of Tennessee, the bill’s sponsor, or President Obama, who signed it into law.

a bad idea, in my opinion

I’ve seen this movie before–twice in the UK alone.  It invariably has an unhappy ending as undisclosed and undetected defects in the listing companies come to light.  Trusting investors get their fingers burned.  The country’s stock market gets a black eye.

The only “job creation” that occurs is at the underwriters and the law firms who are involved in litigation when shareholders sue.  Ironically, JOBS would appear to eliminate the latter source of employment.

enter Manchester United, a 134 year-old “emerging growth” company

The latest to take advantage of the JOBS Act is the UK professional soccer club Manchester United, which is going public today on the NYSE, under the ticker symbol MANU.  MANU was founded in 1878, by the way, so it has been “emerging” for a very long time.

Another curiosity.  MANU’s form F-1 registration statement is on file with the SEC.  F-1?  Isn’t a registration statement called an S-1?  Yes, normally it is.  But MANU isn’t an American company.  It’s a UK corporation.

Isn’t the natural home of a UK company the London Stock Exchange??

not London

Yes, but MANU has been owned since 2005 by an American, Malcolm Glaser (who also controls the Tampa Bay Buccaneers).  Mr. Glaser is very unloved in the UK because, as a foreigner, he possesses a national icon.  Going public there was out of the question.  The facts that MANU is heavily indebted, makes virtually no money and has a dual share structure (like the New York Times or Hershey) that preserves the Glaser control probably don’t help, either.

not Singapore

With London out, MANU decided to try to list in Singapore.  That makes some superficial sense, since reportedly two-thirds of its fans live in Asia.  Relative to Hong Kong, however, Singapore is an equity market backwater.

MANU subsequently withdrew its proposal, however, citing poor market conditions.  Speculation at the time was that the firm wanted to have at least one ultra-wealthy “cornerstone” investor that would give the offering added legitimacy, but was unable to find one.

not Hong Kong?

It’s unclear whether MANU approached Hong Kong, although this possibility, too, has been a subject of media speculation.  MANU’s lack of profitability might have made the attempt a non-starter.  Official rejection would have been an acute embarrassment for MANU, given that the Hong Kong regulators allowed Russian miner Rusal to list in 2010.


Thanks to the JOBS Act and underwriters Jeffries, Credit Suisse and JP Morgan, the NYSE has snagged this prize.  Half the proceeds of the IPO will go to repay part of MANU’s $500 million+ in debt.  The other half will go to the Glaser family.

It will be interesting to see how the stock trades.

chit funds, crowdfunding and p2p banking (II)

two lessons from history


I was just getting acquainted with Thailand when the Ms. Chamoy Thipyaso chit fund scandal broke.  “Mae” (=Mother) Chamoy, the wife of a Thai Air Force officer, appeared to be running a very large chit fund investment operation that was stringing together a sequence of startlingly high investment returns.  She had agents throughout Thailand collecting new money for her.  Money was pouring in.

The fund turned out to be a gigantic Ponzi scheme, however.

The scheme sustained itself for an unusually long time.  It continued to operate even after it had become so large (US$100 million+) it was implausible to think Mae could find enough lucrative “secret” microfinancing opportunities in Thailand.  Several reasons for this:

–people wanted to believe.

–the fund appeared to have the backing of the military, the ultimate source of political and business leadership in Thailand.  This gave an implied assurance that the investment results were real.  Prominent high-ranking Air Force officers invested with Mae, and forcefully urged their subordinates to do so as well.

–investors who thought about withdrawing some of their “profits” were pressured not to do so, with the threat that if they took money out they would be blacklisted and not allowed to invest in the fund thereafter.

Interestingly, large investors in the Chamoy fund continued to urge their friends and work subordinates to plow money into the fund even after they realized it was a Ponzi scheme.  Their rationale?   …it bought them more time.  That extra time allowed them to continue to enjoy a lifestyle they knew was going to end when the fraud was discovered.  And it allowed them to arrange their financial affairs in a way that would minimize the negative impact on them personally.  To followers of the Bernie Madoff case in the US, this must certainly sound familiar.

my thoughts

In my reading about microfinance, it seems that Ponzi schemes have been a constant problem wherever third-party chit funds–not the ones where friends and neighbors lend to one another–operate.  That means virtually everyplace in South Asia and Africa.  There seems to be an especially large amount of study done of the industry in India, which I have no practical experience with (because the stock market isn’t easily open to foreigners–and I think the political environment is particularly unfriendly toward equity investors.)

Personally, I’d worry more about Ponzi schemes in the US springing up among the firms that the JOBS Act will allow to raise equity.  These are the entities that won’t have adequate financial controls or accounting statements for shareholders.

My chief p2p banking concern is a more prosaic one–that the present very low loan loss rates will prove to be more a function of the industry’s newness rather than of the creditworthiness of borrowers.  Time will tell.  And, unlike fraud, this is a risk we can take precautions for.


There was a unique twist to the Taiwanese chit fund industry that I encountered in the mid-1980s.   Chit fund loans were secured by post-dated checks issued to the borrowers by the lenders.  In Taiwan at that time, “bouncing” a check–having insufficient funds in the account to cover payment–was a felony, punishable by the check writer serving time in prison.

The threat of jail time was thought to be sufficient incentive to ensure repayment.  So no one worried too much about the creditworthiness of the borrowers, which–as it turned out–included large publicly-traded companies.  American accountants I met, who’d been sent to Taiwan to break into the auditing business there, told me that they could see the fact of unaccounted-for money sloshing around in potential client companies.  They just couldn’t see how much.  Because of this, they were reluctant to take any engagements.  And they were continually undercut by local accounting firms who charged virtually nothing for “audits.”   American bank lending officers told me the same thing.

The chit fund business received a major shock, during a mild economic downturn, some large companies had made hundreds of millions of dollars in chit fund loans–all unrecorded in the financial accounts–that they couldn’t repay.  Bankruptcies resulted.

my thoughts

This is another potential problem for equity holders in firms crowdfunded under the JOBS Act.  Without audited financials, it’s impossible for an outside investor to determine what the capital structure of a company is.

I also think, à la Taiwan, a legitimate auditor will simply walk away from a suspect company rather than make a public outcry.  Non-disclosure agreements may force it to do no more.  A less fastidious auditor, one nobody ever heard of, might take the business and issue a clean opinion.  After all, Bernie Madoff got one for years, didn’t he?