what’s going on in stock markets?

technicals

From the intraday high of 2132 on July 20th, the S&P 500 has fallen by almost 12.5% to its intraday low of 1867 yesterday.

For fans of support and resistance, 1867 is within hailing distance of the 1820 intraday low for the index in mid-October 2014.  The closing lows at that October bottom were 1867 on both October 15th and 16th.

That all adds up to a severe correction by the experience of the past few years, but still one that might be called “garden variety.”

opposing signals

What’s unusual about this decline is that virtually the entire fall happened in a panic-filled two-day period–last Friday and yesterday.

So this all gives us two opposing market signals.  On the one hand, in the normal two-steps-forward-one-step-backward rhythm of stock markets, we’ve finally made a significant backward step over a suitably long period of time.  One might conclude that we’re done with that phase and are ready for the next up move.

On the other hand, the past two trading days have been fear-filled.  On Friday, the S&P was down by 3%+ and closed on its lows.  Yes, it was a Friday, so brokerage houses flattened their books going into the weekend (translation:  dumped inventory into the market near the close).  Even so, closing on the lows sends shivers down traders’ spines.  Then the market opened on Monday down by about 6%, another stomach acid inducer.  Pundits rushed in to “explain” the goings on to retail investors as a sign that the Chinese economy (the largest, or second-largest, depending on how you count, economy in the world) was imploding–with dire consequences for the rest of the globe.  That increased the fear quotient.

My point here is that emotions are much more powerful that we usually recognize–and they linger.  Maybe the market had been fearful for close to a month and purged that fear over the past two trading days.  But I don’t have the sense that anyone was afraid before fireworks erupted on Friday.  That’s my main hesitation about saying Monday represents a selling climax that clears the way for upward progress.

China not the cause

I think that China is the trigger for what’s happening in markets now, not the cause.

I’m torn between two viewpoints on China as an economy.  I think the hedge funds proclaiming that the selloff in oil and metals is due to economic weakness in China that Beijing is covering up–and that we are due for a protracted bout of global economic weakness–are completely wrong.  On the other hand, either they or their brethren spouted similar nonsense about hyperinflation being induced by Fed action five years or so ago.  Everyone now knows that was totally wrong–yet this craziness struck a responsive chord and influenced stock trading for an extended period of time.

My conclusion:  this isn’t a time to bet heavily on whether the market is going up or down (it almost never is).

trading up

During periods like this, most investors, even professionals, tend to go on vacation.  They just don’t look at the daily ups and downs of prices.  For anyone who can stand the rocking of the boat, however, there’s useful portfolio work that can be done to upgrade holdings.

–clunkers that have never gone up usually don’t go down a lot in general market declines.   Strong stocks that have gone up a lot typically get pummeled.  So this is a great time to ditch the former and use the money to buy the latter.

–we’re in a time of significant structural economic change.  I think the prophets of doom are mistaking that for cyclical economic weakness.  Losers in a time like this are typically large and well-known; potential winners are typically smaller and more obscure.  For most of us, the appropriate switch is from old-line, status-quo stocks into ETFs that are focused on Millennials.

 

stock options and stock buybacks

I first became aware of the crucial relationship between stock option grants and stock buybacks in the late 1990s.

I was on a research trip to San Francisco, where I had dinner with the new CEO, a turnaround specialist, of a chip design and manufacturing company with a checkered history.

In the course of our conversation, he said that one of his objectives was to ensure he retained top talent.  He went on to mention, as if it were a matter of course, that he would do so by having his firm issue enough stock options to transfer ownership of 6% of the company each year to workers (I’m pretty sure 6% was the number, but it could have been 8%).

I was shocked.

My first thought was that after eight years (six years, if the 8% is correct), there’d potentially be 50% more shares out.  This would massively dilute the ownership interest of any shares I might buy for clients.

My second was that I would have to evaluate the potential for massive positive earnings surprises that would make the stock skyrocket if the turnaround were successful, against the steady erosion of my ownership interest through stock option issuance.  (I decided to bet on skyrocket, which ended up being the right thing to do).

My third was that eventually suppliers of equity capital like me would have to question whether the kind of ownership shift this CEO was presenting as normal tilted rewards too far in the direction of management.

 

After this experience, I began to look much more carefully at the share option schemes of companies that might potentially be in one of my portfolios.  I noticed that in many cases companies had stock buyback programs–pitched as a “return to shareholders” of profits, sort of like dividends–that almost exactly offset the dilution from the issuance of new stock to employees.

This isn’t the case for all companies, but my observation is that it is for many.  I don’t think this is a coincidence.

Part of the rational for buybacks, it seems to me, is simply to prevent dilution of earnings per share, which would arguably help no one.  But at the same time, for the casual observer who looks only at share count and at earnings vs. eps, it obscures how big the corporate stock option issuance plan is.  I don’t think this is an accident, either.  Yes, the information is all in the SEC filings, but the reality is that even many investment professionals don’t read them.

That’s what I find problematic about stock buybacks–that I feel they’re misleadingly described as a shareholder benefit, while their purpose is to play down the level of key employee compensation.

 

 

capital raising by Tesla (TSLA)

the offering

Last Friday, TSLA filed a final prospectus with the SEC, indicating that it is selling up to 3.099 million new shares of common stock (including underwriters’ over-allotment) at $242 a share.   This will net the company close to three-quarters of a billion dollars, which it needs to fund ambitious expansion plans–the Gigafactory to make batteries the chief among them.

I presume the precipitous decline of TSLA shares over the past ten days or so was triggered by underwriters soliciting indications of interest in this offering from hedge funds and other institutional investors.  Two bullish signs:  the offering was initially pitched as being 2.1 million shares, but raised to 2.7 million on Friday (not counting the underwriters’ allotment, which will have been bumped up as well).  As I’m writing this prior to Monday’s open, TSLA shares are trading at around $255 each.

my thoughts, (somewhat) randomly presented

  1.  TSLA made what I consider a firm-transforming offering of $3 billion in convertible bonds (at a conversion price of $350 (!!!) a share) last year.  This says something about how professional fixed income investors feel about the attractiveness of straight bonds.  More important for TSLA, the successful offering took talk of building the Gigafactory out of the realm of fantasy and placed it solidly into reality.
  2. The automobile world has changed significantly over the past year, with the plunge in oil prices and the rise of ride-sharing services like Uber.  The former may mess up the economics of electic vehicles; the latter calls into question the highly operationally leveraged corporate structure of traditional car companies (translation into English:  if they need to run at, say, 80% of plant capacity to break even, will that be possible if Millennials en masse use Uber instead of buying a car themselves.  Will the car industry be a replay of the current commodities debacle).
  3. My guess is that these shifts: (i) increase TSLA’s attractiveness to stock market investors vs. conventional car companies, and (ii) make Teslas relatively more attractive abroad, where petroleum products are more expensive than in the US.
  4. It seemed clear to me from the outset that the 2014 bond offering didn’t totally solve TSLA’s need for capital.  Another offering had to happen in 2015.  I’d expected more bonds.  Why stock instead?  Market etiquette says that a new offering should be at a higher price–here meaning a higher conversion price–than previous ones (otherwise last year’s buyers look like idiots).  Also, potential lenders periodically want companies to prove that they still have enthusiastic equity backers.  This is a combination of lenders not wanting financial leverage to be too high, their not wanting to be the only ones holding the bag if things go sour, and their knowledge that bonds are going to be under pressure as interest rates begin to rise.
  5. Last year’s offering signaled a near-term top for TSLA shares.   My instinct is to think that this offering establishes a near-term bottom.  I own a small position in the stock, however, so I may have an interest in thinking this is the case.