important (I think) information in Wall Street action yesterday, Oct 4, 2011

what bear markets look like

Bear markets have two key characteristics:

1.  psychological.  In a bear market, investors ignore good news and obsess over bad.  Negative stuff is all that gets a reaction–and it’s always to sell.  The opposite is true in a bull market.  Then, people focus on good news and use it to justify bidding stocks up.  Maybe they know bad stuff, but that’s just  intellectual awareness, and they don’t let it get in the way of the market party.

That’s certainly the current stock market mindset.

2.  economic.  Garden variety bear markets stem from government action to slow down an overheating economy.  They last about a year.  Longer, deeper ones have come from structural failures.  The sharp oil price increases of the 1970s are the standard example.  The financial meltdown of 2007-2008 is the most recent one.

Neither seems to me to be the case today.

the current situation

Emotionally, the bears are in control in world financial markets.  On Wall Street, we’ve moved down, pretty much in one-way fashion, from 1356 on the S&P 500 in early July to 1074 intraday yesterday.

Economically, however, the world continues to be in recovery. Anemic, yes, but recovery nonetheless.  In fact, recent economic indicators suggest the world is in a little better shape than the consensus has been expecting.

yesterday’s trading started badly…

Yesterday’s fall was typical bear market performance.  Stocks dropped from the open, despite positive domestic economic news and a report from the Macau government that gambling revenue was up 39% year on year in September.  The Macau increase came even though a typhoon toward the end of the month virtually shut Macau down for a day or two. The report shows, I think, that the predictions of a sharp slowdown in spending by affluent Chinese are at best premature.  (Plausible or not–I’m in the “not” camp, the predictions are all that Wall Street has chosen to hear.)

The casino stocks, and names like TIF that have important Chinese exposure, rallied early on the Macau news but had lost all their gains and were headed for negative territory by 3pm.

…3pm news drew a sharply positive reaction…

Around that time, news from Europe began to circulate that the EU had finally decided to act to shore up the financial strength of its major commercial banks.  That would put an end to worries that bankruptcy of EU member Greece would cause the banks–major lenders to Athens–to collapse.  It would also put to rest fear of a second devastating period of paralysis of world economic activity, like the one that followed the Lehman bankruptcy in late 2008.

Wall Street rallied almost 5% in a little more than half an hour.

…showing, I think, investors’ true concern

If yesterday is a good guide, the main reason for continued selling is anticipation of a repeat of the dark days of September 2008-March 2009, not a reaction to an economic action–which is historically what bear markets have been all about.

Investors aren’t so concerned about the possibility that long-term unemployment being high in the US or about short-term-growth slowing in China from 10% real to 5% real.  It’s all about EU policy.

if so, what good is knowing this?

It makes some sense of the peculiar situation we’re in, that the economic facts and the market psychology don’t match up.

It suggests to me that thinking carefully about the worst case that’s likely to come out of Europe is important to do.

And it seems to me that the situation in Greece is quickly coming to a head and that EU governments will have to act before the end of the year.

So we may currently be in the situation of a bear market in time from now on, rather than one of market levels–if the worst that can come from the EU is almost fully discounted.  And a positive turn in sentiment would presumably come from policy action, not from the lengthy process of economies reaching and passing an economic low point.

This doesn’t necessarily mean that markets will go rocketing up if a reasonable resolution of the Greece crisis is reached.  But it does seem to me to imply that market attention would return to the “normal” business of assessing company fundamentals–and that stock picking would again be a fruitful way to pass the day.

 

 

slumping casino stocks

a China-related selloff

In yesterday’s trading in New York, MPEL, a pure play on Macau casinos, fell steadily during the day end ended down 9.3%.  WYNN, down more than 10% intraday, closed with a loss of 7%+.  LVS, which had fallen almost 8% during the afternoon, closed down 5.3%.  MGM, the third Las Vegas/Macau conglomerate–but a company with other issues–shed a “mere” 3.3% of its value.

That was just a warmup act for Hong Kong overnight.  Wynn Macau fell more than 17% overnight and Sands China 14%.  The “best” of the Macau casino performers among Hang Seng stocks was SJM Holdings, which lost 8.4%.

All these issues have given up about a third of their value in the past couple of months–although almost all remain strong year-to-date outperformers.

Why?

The ostensible reason is that growth in China may be slowing–maybe even to the point where, at the bottom, the country will be posting only a 5% GDP advance in a year or two.  Casinos weren’t the only decliners on this worry.  TIF fell almost 7% yesterday, after having been down over 10% intraday.  In contrast, Signet Jewelers, which has only US and UK operations, rose slightly.

my thoughts

It seems to me that there’s no rational basis for the declines.  Affluent Americans haven’t stopped buying at TIF, for example, despite the fact that the US economy is barely north of zero.  Quite the opposite.  Jewelry comps throughout the industry are at 10%+–and rising.  So I don’t see the logic to the argument that because affluent Chinese citizens will have “only” 20% more income next year rather than being up 35%, their consumption patterns will change markedly.

Two caveats:

Bad markets aren’t rational.  They’re emotional.  In hindsight, they may make little sense.  But that’s cold comfort if you get run over by a runaway locomotive barreling down a track where nothing logically should be.

The depth of these declines has got to suggest to a growth investor like me that I might be wrong in my assessment of future earnings.

what to do

A value investor would add to his positions.

A growth investor who owned none of these stocks would buy a little–and then watch for a while.  A growth investor like me, who has a large enough holding in this sector already, tries to take the point of view of the seller to try to discover what he knows that I don’t.

On that score, I’m coming up empty so far.  For me, then, the best course is to stay on the sidelines.

The next important data point will be the release of September Macau gaming revenue by the SAR government, possibly over the coming weekend.

 

Macau’s August 2011 gambling results: another record

August gaming results for Macau

Prior to the opening of Friday trading in Hong Kong, the Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau released its monthly report for August on the gambling “win” of the casinos in the SAR.   Here are the fig

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2011 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2011 2010 Variance 2011 2010 Variance
Jan 18,571 13,937 +33.2% 18,571 13,937 +33.2%
Feb 19,863 13,445 +47.7% 38,434 27,383 +40.4%
Mar 20,087 13,569 +48.0% 58,521 40,951 +42.9%
Apr 20,507 14,186 +44.6% 79,028 55,137 +43.3%
May 24,306 17,075 +42.4% 103,334 72,211 +43.1%
Jun 20,792 13,642 +52.4% 124,126 85,853 +44.6%
Jul 24,212 16,310 +48.4% 148,337 102,163 +45.2%
Aug 24,769 15,773 +57.0% 173,106 117,935 +46.8%

Source: Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau

Interestingly, despite this unexpected good news all the major Hong Kong-listed casino companies, except China Sands, went down by more than the market (the Hang Seng was off by 1.8% overnight).

The prevailing sentiment in Hong Kong seems to be that the Macau gaming market’s gains will never be any better than this and that a slowdown to 20% growth rate or less is imminent.  The reaction to today’s GICB announcement just confirms the same market reaction–selling–that a recent Deutsche Bank research report expressing the same sentiments provoked.

If extensive press reporting of the researcher’s reasoning–a falloff in Chinese buying of German luxury cars presages a general reduction in spending–are correct, her conclusion is a little loony.  So the DB report probably isn’t the reason for the selling.  But it apparently did voice worries that investors have had, perhaps on general principles, perhaps simply because the stocks have been such spectacular performers over the past year or two.

It is true that 2011 will be a tough act for Macau to follow.  My own feeling, however, is that the SAR has at least a couple of more years of substantially above normal growth before it settles down to an expansion rate more in line with that of China’s nominal GDP.  I think “settle down” would mean 10%-12% annual revenue growth for the market and a 15%-18% annual gain in aggregate profit.

Investment interest would then presumably turn to sorting out relative winners from relative losers. That may be happening now.  My pick for top of the winners’ column is Wynn Macau (1128); my sense is that Hong Kong’s is SJM (0880).

Ultimately, relative earnings growth will determine who’s right and who’s wrong.  For now, it seems to me that the selling of the past week or so among the Macau casino stocks already pretty well discounts the imminent maturity of the industry.  In Wynn Macau’s case, I think the price suggests Hong Kong views it as an average performer–no worse, but certainly no better.

Macau gambling: July 2011 results; longer-term outlook

July 2011 results

For Macau, it was business as usual in July–another huge, and surprisingly strong,  year on year increase in casino win from gamblers in the SAR.  Here are the numbers from the Macau Gaming Coordination and Inspection Bureau:

* 1 HKD = 1.03MOP (Unit:MOP million )
Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune in 2011 and 2010
Monthly Gross Revenue Accumulated Gross Revenue
2011 2010 Variance 2011 2010 Variance
Jan 18,571 13,937 +33.2% 18,571 13,937 +33.2%
Feb 19,863 13,445 +47.7% 38,434 27,383 +40.4%
Mar 20,087 13,569 +48.0% 58,521 40,951 +42.9%
Apr 20,507 14,186 +44.6% 79,028 55,137 +43.3%
May 24,306 17,075 +42.4% 103,334 72,211 +43.1%
Jun 20,792 13,642 +52.4% 124,126 85,853 +44.6%
Jul 24,212 16,310 +48.4% 148,337 102,163 +45.2%

source: Macau Gaming Coordination and Inspection Bureau

To me, the interesting thing about these figures is that the year on year market gains seem to be accelerating over the past two months.  Hong Kong investors, however, continue to fret about the possibility that withdrawal, underway for a considerable time already, of the countercyclical stimulus Beijing applied during the financial crisis in the West will stunt growth in Macau.

Macau Business magazine indicates, for what it’s worth, that Galaxy Entertainment continues to gain market share, as gamblers visit its recently opened Galaxy Macau casino in Cotai.  Wynn Macau also appears to have been a relative winner.

the longer term

The most attractive aspect of the casino business for me as an investor is that it is relatively simple to analyze.  Revenue growth under normal circumstances is a function of two variables:

–the growth in the amount of floor space in the market and

–the growth of nominal GDP ( or nominal disposable income, if you prefer) in the area the casinos’ customers come from.

The very strong market growth numbers in Macau indicate that conditions there aren’t “normal.”  There’s still a substantial imbalance between the potential demand for gambling from China as a whole and the supply of casino space in Macau.  Network effects are still at work increasing the number of gamblers able to afford a trip to Macau who want to go.  Transport and border control bottlenecks still exist.  Rapid economic expansion is also swelling the ranks of those who can afford Macau.  I think we have at least several more years of this.

What happens when the imbalance is gone?  Well, the main thing is that the 40%-50% growth rates disappear as well.  From that point on, market growth becomes mostly a function of nominal GDP expansion.  For China, that probably means 8% real growth plus 4% inflation, or about 12% annual growth in revenues.  Operating leverage means that a 12% revenue increase will translate into 18% profit growth.  In addition, the market will likely split into relative winners and relative losers.  The former will grow profits at 20%, the latter at 15%.

It strikes me that the Hong Kong-listed casino companies are all currently priced as if the low end of the range will emerge as the norm almost immediately.  I think that’s highly unlikely.

 

 

Las Vegas Sands–a bounceback in 2Q11

the results

In 2Q11, LVS had unusually bad luck in its gambling operations in Singapore and in Las Vegas.  That happens occasionally.  Give a properly run casino enough time, however, and the odds even out.  2Q11 was a more normal quarter for the company from an odds point of view.  Combine that with stunning growth in Singapore, and the result was revenue for LVS during 2Q11 of $2.35 billion, up 47% year on year.  Eps of $.54 weere more than triple the net during the comparable period of 2010, and 25% ahead of the Wall Street consensus.

the details

To my mind, the biggest story is Singapore, where EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization–I’m not a fan of this metric, but it’s the one this industry uses) was $405.4 million, up 42% quarter on quarter (up “only” 30% if you adjust 1Q11 results up to reflect normal “luck”)July may turn out to be the best month ever for the Marina Bay complex–which, strictly speaking, isn’t even finished.  Singapore is now by far the most valuable part of LVS.

I wasn’t floored by the Macau results, which–at EBITDA of $391.6 million–were up 27.5% year on year and about 4% quarter on quarter (market growth rates were 40%+ and 12%+, respectively, during those periods).  The issues are new capacity that opened recently right next to some of LVS’s operations, and the time it tales to recover from the actions of an inept CEO (since fired; he’s suing).  The Hong Kong stock market, however, regards the earnings report as very good news.  Sands China was up 10% in overnight in a flat market.

Las Vegas continues its slow recovery.  LVS posted EBITDA of $92 million in 2Q11 for Nevada operations. The lion’s share of the $30+ million quarter on quarter gain is a return of casino “luck” to normal.

$10 billion in debt no longer looks like such a big problem

Roughly speaking, $4 billion of that amount is borrowed against Singapore operations, $3 billion against Macau and $3 billion against the US.  LVS has just renegotiated the Macau debt to extend maturities and lower interest expense by close to $100 million yearly.  LVS will likely refinance Singapore soon, as well.

My back-of-the-envelope guess is that the LVS empire will generate $2.5 billion-$3 billion in cash flow over the coming 12 months.  Call it $2.8 billion.  Assume calls on that cash of $1 billion for capital expenditure plus $300 million for interest expense and $200 million for extra working capital.  That leaves $1.3 billion to go to debt repayment.  If LVS could manage twelve months without major capital outlays, borrowings would be more than cut in half in under three years.

Also, were LVS to sell 15% of Marina Bay in an IPO, I think it would raise enough to wipe out all its US debt.  I doubt this will happen until the property is more mature, but the possibility has to make lenders–and investors–feel more comfortable about LVS’ debt level.

And, of course, LVS has $3 billion or so in cash on its balance sheet.

the stock

A sum of the parts calculation is probably the most reasonable.

At yesterday’s closing price, LVS had a market capitalization of $33.8 billion.  The company’s share of publicly traded Sands China is worth $17 billion.  If we assume that Marina Bay would trade on the same valuation as Sands China–which could prove much too low–then that 100%-owned property is worth $24 billion.

This means Wall Street is valuing LVS’ US operations at -$7 billion.  This compares with a +$7 billion implied valuation for WYNN’s US operations and +$3.3 billion for those of heavily indebted MGM.

LVS shares (which I own–I may sell some today, though) would have to rise by about 30%, just for the implied valuation of its US properties to match those of MGM.  It would take a 20% rise just to get the value up to zero.

Why the disconnect?  I don’t know.  The former CEO of Sands China is suing, and claiming all sorts of improprieties by LVS management.  It’s also possible that some investors are uncomfortable with LVS’s debt–I know I have been–or don’t understand that the earnings disappointment in 1Q11 is just one of those things that happen in the gambling business.