Portfolio Management–How often to measure(ii), Analyze performance monthly

Most professionals, and many institutional clients, use portfolio attribution reports as a key tool for interpreting the results a portfolio manager achieves. I’ve always found it an excellent planning tool, as well.

I’ve looked on the internet, admittedly not as hard as I probably should have, for a service providing anything remotely resembling a performance attribution report and have found nothing.  At some point, I should probably have an attribution tool on this blog, but for now you’ll have to construct a simple one for yourself.

What I describe below is a rough-and-ready tool.  It takes shortcuts that simplify the calculations, so the results are not accurate to the last basis point.  But for us, that’s not the most important thing.  The reason to do create a periodic performance attribution report is to establish a procedure for sitting down and thinking about the actively-managed portion of a portfolio, seeing what is going right and what is going wrong, and deciding what–if anything–to do about it.

For anyone who’s interested, I’ll talk about the major simplifications at the end of the post. Continue reading →

Portfolio Management–How often to measure (i) Look at your positions every day

The short answer

It’s important to distinguish between looking at prices, which I think you should do every day for any individual stocks you may own, and measuring performance of your actively-managed securities (including ETFs and mutual funds) vs. the benchmark you have selected.  Under normal circumstances, I think you should do the latter only once a month or even once a quarter, unless you think something is going seriously wrong with your investment plan (how to tell if something is really going wrong will be the subject of a later post). Continue reading →

Portfolio management–why measure performance?

Two reasons to measure performance

There are two general reasons why it’s essential for any investor to periodically and methodically measure investment performance:

–to protect and build your financial assets, and

–to develop your skills in making investment judgments.

These reasons hold whether you decide to manage your money directly or elect to hire a financial planner of some type to help you with the process.

Using a financial planner

Let’s start with the financial planner case.  A typical arrangement will entail your agreeing to pay the planner a percentage of the assets under management in return for his/her advice.

This type of arrangement is sometimes called a “wrap fee” account.  The percentage can vary, but in my experience it usually ranges from 1.5%-2.0% of assets.

Until relatively recently, when government scrutiny of these arrangements forced changes, even assets held in money market funds were subject to the full fee.  Today, it’s common to have a lower fee apply to cash or bond assets.  (The planner will typically receive other compensation that is rarely, if ever, mentioned. For example, the planner will receive a “12b1” fee of .2%-.3% of assets per year from the mutual fund companies whose offerings the planner’s clients hold.  A fund company  may also pay food, transportation and lodging expenses for the planner to attend educational seminars held at posh resorts.  This can happen if the planner is a very successful asset gatherer or if he reaches a threshold level of client ownership of the fund company’s products.)

What a hypothetical investor pays a planner

Taking our hypothetical investor with $1 million in equity assets, the yearly fees paid to a financial advisor will be on the order of $25,000.  That’s a new car, a wedding, college tuition at any state university, several lavish vacations–or the carrying costs of a vacation home.  I could go on, but you get my point.  This is serious money.

You owe it to yourself to find out what, if anything, you’re getting for this outlay. Continue reading →

My Take on US June-Quarter Earnings

The June quarter earnings report season is practically over.  Two things strike me as noteworthy:

1.  Most companies’ profit results handily beat analysts’ expectations.  This in itself is not so surprising, since earnings are difficult to estimate in uncertain times and because neither companies in their guidance to analysts, nor analysts in their reports, saw any advantage to be gained by putting out a number that might be too high.

What is noteworthy, though, is that the better than expected earnings were accompanied by worse than expected revenues.  This doesn’t usually happen.  Normally, surprisingly weak revenues produce really, really awful earnings.  The reason?  …operating leverage.  An illustration:

2008                           2009 (est.)

sales                             120                         100

direct costs                    90                           75

gross profit                              30                           25

overheads                                 20                           20

operating profit                              10                               5

In this simple example, I’ve divided costs into two types, the out-of-pocket expenses of making the product the company sells and indirect costs, like advertising, interest expense, depreciation, the chairman’s salary…  A 20% reduction in sales produces a 50% fall in profits.  That’s operating leverage, working in a downturn.

In a recession, the reality is probably worse than this.   I’ve assumed that the company can mark up its products by a third over its production costs, so that the reduction in revenues is due solely to a falloff in units sold.  But in bad times, customers pressure suppliers to lower their prices as well.  So the sales numbers for 2009 might really be 90 instead of 100.  If everything else remains the same, the company ends up with a loss of 5.

Where, then, did the surprisingly strong earnings come from?  I don’t think it’s all from deliberate low ball guidance and estimates.  I think the companies that could must have cut costs in a truly unprecedented way, enough to reverse the negatvie effect of operating leverage.

My point?  With costs pared to the bone, the positive effect on earnings when revenues and profit margins begin to expand again could be immense.

2.  Strong companies often make their greatest market share gains during recessions.  Why is this?  For one thing, customers are much more careful in bad times about how they spend their money.  And strong firms can use a combination of their superior technology, manufacturing skill and financial muscle to offer products that weaker rivals either can’t match or can’t match while still remaining profitable.

I see this phenomenon as a strong feature of the June quarter:  for every Samsung, there’s a Sony; for every Apple, there’s a Microsoft; for every Hyundai, there’s a GM; for every Activision, there’s an Electronic Arts.

In every possible pairing of this type, there’s an interesting investment judgment to be made.  Will the weaker rival benefit much more strongly in terms of percentage profit gains when the economy turns up again (i.e., are they going to be really good stocks) or will they be so damaged by the downturn that they just can’t recover.