US unemployment: lessons from Japan’s lost decades

Recent unemployment reports have begun to show what is likely the last shoe to drop in recession-related job losses in the US.  State and local governments have begun to lay off workers as they try to come into compliance with laws that require them to balance their budgets in a time of falling revenues.  (As a byproduct, large budget deficits are also highlighting a difficult long-term issue.  Like the US car companies of the Seventies until they went into bankruptcy, state and municipal governments have promised employees munificent retirement packages of pension and medical benefits that they cannot possibly afford. Estimates of the shortfall between what the states have promised to pay and what they’ve put aside to cover these expenses range up to several trillion dollars.)

Non-government hiring has begun to perk up, but not by enough to absorb all the new entrants to the workforce.  So that does little to aid the plight of those laid off during the economic downturn.  And, as we gain more distance from the financial crisis itself, pundits are beginning to realize that the US unemployment problem has more causes than simply that we are suffering the hangover from having several years of way too many people building way too much housing, offices and shopping malls.  There are also at least two big secular issues:  the destruction of an older, more labor-intensive distribution system by the Internet, and the expanding role in world trade of firms from the developing world with excellent products and a wage scale sharply below that of the developed economies.

Japan had a very similar problem when the money authority raised interest rates in late 1989 in an attempt to deflate a speculative real estate and financial market bubble.  Not only did the country have glut of detached houses, apartments office buildings and shopping centers.  It was beginning to feel competitive pressure from China.  And it was close to completing a massive expansion of its industrial base that upped its companies’ ability to crank out Eighties-era products that were very quickly becoming obsolete.

The Japanese government responded to its crisis in several ways.  I denied it had a problem.  It covered up bank loan losses for a decade.  It encouraged financial institutions to lend to bankrupt “zombie” corporations and enacted legislation that prevented activist investors from unseating incompetent managements.  The Diet also launched wave after wave of public works construction projects aimed at keeping its myriad of construction workers employed (what else were these workers equipped to do?), but which created no long-term additions to national wealth and ran up a gigantic government deficit.

All in all, Japan seemed to do everything it could to prevent economic adjustment from happening.  Look what that produced–twenty years of economic stagnation.

The US is unlikely to follow the same path.  For one thing, we know from Japan’s example where it leads.  For another, we have two (arguably quirky and backward-looking, but still espousing different points of view) national political parties in the US not just one.  And the national debate is beginning to distinguish clearly between short-term economic band aids that are basically a waste of money and measures that will help the longer-term competitiveness of the US economy.  The downside to this, more sensible, approach is that unemployment will remain high for a longer time.

From an investment point of view, two aspects of the current US situation are interesting:

–One is that publicly traded US companies have been posting very strong profit growth in spite of the general economic malaise.  It makes sense that this could happen since half of their business is outside the US, much of that in fast-growing emerging markets.  Also, publicly traded companies are typically the best of breed.  And although the market has a health dose of financial firms, it has almost no exposure to the hardest-hit industries, like construction or autos.

–The other is that domestic investors seem unable to absorb this information, and act as if the S&P should follow the course of the general economy and the unemployment rate.  This, despite many examples of stock markets outside the US (the UK or Hong Kong are particularly good instances) where there is a sharp differentiation between the performance of the economy and that of the market.  In a perverse way, this is a good thing for stocks, since as investors gradually connect the dots in a new economic world they should be increasingly drawn to equities.

DIS: strong fiscal third quarter (ended 3July10)

the results

DIS reported a very strong third fiscal quarter of 2010 (quarter ended 3 July) after the close on Tuesday.  EPS were $.67 for the three months vs.  $.51 in the comparable period of fiscal 2009.  Quarterly revenues grew to $10.0 billion, up by 16% from last year’s $8.6 billion.

details

One of the more interesting aspects of following DIS is the out-of-the-ordinary accounting (totally above-board, but quirky) that is customary for its collection of businesses to use.

For example, if I were to ask you to guess where the largest dollar increase in operating income for the just ended quarter comes from, you’d probably say Studio Entertainment–thinking of the smash box office successes of Iron Man 2 and Toy Story 3, and the release of Alice in Wonderland to DVD. Good guess, but it would be wrong.  Net of writedowns of film clunkers, the increase here was $135 million.  The actual biggest jump comes in Media Networks, and derives from recognition of $381 million in previously deferred ESPN cable affiliate revenue.  What’s that?  Read on.

By segment, the 3Q10 results are as follows:

Media Networks          $1885 million, up $556 million

Parks and Resorts          $477 million, down $44 million

Studio Entertainment          $123 million, up $135 million

Consumer Products          $117 million, up 96 million

Interactive Media          -65 million, up $10 million

Total          $2, 537 million, up $688 million

Media Networks

ABC television was basically flat at $209 million in operating income, which I consider to be a good result.

Cable (ESPN + the Disney channel, but mostly ESPN) was up $561 million at $1,675 million.  That’s a 50% jump, year over year.  Of that, $381 million came from recognition of previously deferred revenue from ESPN.  Otherwise, operating income would have been up by 16%.

ESPN advertising revenues were up by 31%, mostly because its coverage of the FIFA World Cup was a fabulous success, but also because the NBA finals between the Lakers and Celtics was a compelling series and lasted seven games.  Ex these factors, ad revenue would have increased by a still healthy 17%.

Finally, to deferred revenues.  ESPN’s contracts with its cable customers provide for what are in effect bonus payments if the sports network exceeds specified levels of subscribership.  FIFA and the NBA meant that many of these levels were hit in the third quarter this fiscal year vs. the fourth quarter of last fiscal year.  DIS thinks it will collect $355 million less in these fees during the fourth quarter of this year than in the final three months of fiscal 2009.  IN other words, the big 3Q number represents a shift in the timing of ESPN earnings these payments, rather than a gigantic increase in the payments themselves.

The bottom line, though, is that ESPN continues to do extremely well, and the other, much smaller, parts of cable/broadcasting are managing to tread water in a tough environment.

Parks and Resorts

This business is basically flat.  The most important thing is that DIS is trying, successfully so far, to end the sharp discounts it was forced to give last year to lure patrons to its parks and resorts.  Per guest spending in Disney hotels was up by 4%, but occupancy was down by about 6%.  Similarly, guest spending in the parks was up by 5% and attendance down 3%.

The Easter holiday, and the accompanying spurt in park business, started in DIS’s second fiscal quarter this year instead of the third, where it usually is.  This means that the year on year comparisons in this business segment are actually slightly better–maybe a percentage point or two–on the occupancy and attendance side–than the reported numbers.

More accounting arcana:  Fourth quarter hotel reservations are down 9% year on year.  That’s about what DIS’s recent experience has been.  But the number is in fact much better than it seems.  Its hotel-theme park-resorts roots have led DIS to organize its books on a week-by-week basis.  Each “quarter” consists of 13 weeks.  But four periods like this add up to 364 days, meaning DIS has to periodically add an extra week to the fourth quarter of its fiscal year so that its accounting quarters and the calendar quarters match closely.  Last year was one of those 53 week years.

On an apples to apples basis, reservations are down about 1%, despite the lower discounts.  This won’t cause a big surge in income but it signals that this business is gradually improving.

Studio Entertainment

This segment needs little explanation.  Iron Man 2 took in about $600 million in worldwide box office in the third fiscal quarter.  Toy Story 3 has taken in almost $900 million, about half of that falling in this accounting period.  DIS also had unspecified, but “higher” film writedowns than last year.

Consumer Products

Cost-cutting at the Disney stores, plus Toy Story and Marvel merchandise.

Interactive Media

This is a catchall for DIS’s digital startups.  At least losses appear to be stabilizing.

what to make of this

This was a blowout quarter on an operating basis, that was generally aided by the quirks in DIS’s accounting–especially the ESPN results.  The company’s main businesses, ESPN, Pixar and Marvel, continue to perform very well.

The parks business is slowly turning itself around as the economy in the US improves.  The legacy DIS film business seems to be on a sounder footing.  And the company keeps on aggressively updating its structure–Miramax and Power Rangers out, Playdom (social gaming) in.

On a longer-term basis, then, so far so good.

DIS has been an outperformer so far this year, up about 10% relative to the S&P 500.  Continuing success at ESPN and films will probably translate into about 15% eps growth in the coming twelve months.  A rebound in the parks and resorts business would likely add a few percentage points to that.  With the stock trading at about a market multiple and the company buying back stock (it has already bought back all the shares issued to acquire Marvel Entertainment), my guess is that modest outperformance is likely to continue.  The obvious risk is that one business, ESPN, generates the bulk of the company’s earnings.


a new Morningstar study: expense ratios a better performance indicator than stars?

Morningstar, the mutual funds research service famous for its star ratings of funds, apparently issued a press release over the weekend that details a study of its star ratings vs. other fund selection criteria.  I say “apparently” because both the Wall Street Journal and the Associated Press carried the story, but I’ve been unable to locate either the press release or the research document on the Morningstar website.

Two aspects of the WSJ account of the study struck me as interesting.

It’s not the study itself.  From what the press accounts indicate, Morningstar compared the performance of 1-star funds with that of 5-star funds over the five-year period from 2005-March 2010.  The conclusion?–in a majority of cases, an investor who chose funds that charged the lowest fees would have done better than one who used the Morningstar stars.

Although Morningstar has skillfully build a business that generates about $500 million in annual revenue from its star ratings, that fact that they may not have predictive value should come as no surprise. The company itself is careful not to claim that they do.  And there have been academic studies from time to time that have raised the same issue.  Nevertheless, it’s a powerful psychological fact that when faced with highly complex decisions, people are invariably drawn to mechanisms that seem to distill the decision down to a small number of easily understood choices–like “Do I want one star or five?”

What did I find striking?

–the WSJ story notes that 1-star international equity funds outperformed 5-star funds over the study period.  Despite this, just about half of the 1-star funds were closed down during the half decade.  Not only that, but the best performing funds appear to have been the ones that shut their doors.  According the WSJ, the performance situation is reversed when considering funds that survived the entire time period.  5-star survivors outdistanced 1-star survivors.

Why would a fund company shut down a fund that’s outperforming?  Because it can’t get anyone to buy shares.  Why would that be?  My bet is that good performance is not enough to overcome the stigma of a low star rating.  To me this illustrates how powerful Morningstar has become in individual investor behavior.

–as presented in the WSJ, this is a pretty weird study.  Morningstar has over 25 years of data on mutual funds.  Why choose a five-year-and-three-month period?  It should be very simple to see if the same patterns hold over longer time frames.  Did Morningstar look? If so, what did it find?  How did the 2- 3- and 4-star funds, which represent the large bulk of the funds rated, fare?  Did the lowest-cost 5-star funds outperform the highest-cost funds?

Anyway, there are lots of questions the WSJ could have asked that could have provided analysis and insight.  The fact that it didn’t shows what the WSJ has become over the last few years.

the Google-Verizon plan unveiled yesterday

GOOG and VZN made their new internet plan public yesterday.  An explanation is available on the GOOG public policy blog, which links to the proposal’s text on Scribd.  (I searched without success to find the proposal on the VZN website.)

the plan

It has some straightforward features, followed by a couple of curve balls.  First, the plain vanilla–

fixed-line internet

The proposal has five points that deal with the fixed-line internet as it exists today.  They are:

1.  Service providers can’t prevent lawful activity, including sending and receiving content, running applications and using services, and connecting devices to the network.

By implication, service providers would be able to stop unlawful activity or actions that harm the network or users.

2.  Service providers wouldn’t be able to engage in “undue” discrimination against lawful activity in a manner that causes”meaningful” harm.

3.  Service providers would have to disclose terms of service and network management practices “in plain language” and in enough detail that users can make informed choices.

4.  Providers can do “reasonable” network management, including measures to reduce congestion, ensure security and eliminate unwanted or harmful traffic.

5. The FCC would enforce consumer protection and nondiscrimination requirements, not by general rulemaking, but by case-by-case actions against violators.

This leaves the FCC relatively toothless, but that’s basically where Congress and te courts have the agency now.

the eyebrow-raising ideas

These have generally drawn the most unfavorable comment in the blogosphere so far.

1.  Wireless would be exempted from all the fixed-line rules, except for #3, transparency in terms of service.  In other words, service providers could deny access to users if it wanted and prioritize content.  Very convenient for Android-based phones on the VZN network.

2.  “additional or differentiated services” could be offered by any service provider who also runs a broadband internet service governed by the plain-vanilla rules.  On this “differentiated” network, which could make use of internet content, the service provider would be able to prioritize traffic.  On its blog, GOOG offers the examples of online gaming/gambling, education (distance learning?), entertainment (movies, concerts?), and health care monitoring as examples of possible additional services.

my thoughts

It sounds to me like GOOG and VZN want to make very large capital investments in wireless and fixed-line internet service networks and want to setle the ownership issue before they do so.

Up until now, the cable and telephone companies that have built out multi-billion dollar internet networks have been compelled–rightly or wrongly–by their semi-monopoly status to accept the rules of “net neutrality.”  If DIS, for example, wants to offer an internet on-demand movie download service over, say, the Comcast network, in direct competition with Comcast’s own cable on-demand service, net neutrality says Comcast has no choice but to allow this to happen.  More than this, Comcast has to make every effort to ensure DIS has enough bandwidth that its service will be successful.

In some sense, then, content providers own the network just as much as the firms who built it, who are relegated to being nothing more than “dumb pipes” that deliver content to consumers.  I’m not trying to make judgments about what should or should not be the case.  I’m simply trying to describe the current state of affairs.

GOOG and VZN, it seems to me, are content (resigned?) to this being the case with capital investments made to date.  But before they commit new money to build new network infrastructure (GOOG, I think) or enhance an existing one (VZN Wireless) they want to make sure they own the network in the strongest possible sense.

Yes, if GOOG and VZN are permitted to build on their own terms, there’s a chance that the existing fixed-line internet–already a laggard in world terms–will develop more slowly than it would otherwise.  On the other hand, without some assurance that they will own the resulting network, I don’t think a non-utility like GOOG will build anything.  Also, there may be more competition in private networks than one might initially think.  Where GOOG treads can AAPL be far behind?


net neutrality: Google, Verizon and the FCC’s “Third Way”

FCC call for comments

In mid-July, the FCC called for comments on its latest ideas on how it would oversee the internet and deal with net neutrality.  Formulated in May, the agency calls the proposal the “Third Way.”

What made the Third Way necessary was a Federal court decision in April, one I’ve commented on in an earlier post.  In 2008 Comcast had slowed the speed of customers’ access to BitTorrent, a peer-to-peer file-sharing service that Comcast said was hogging too much bandwidth.  The FCC ordered Comcast to stop doing this.  Comcast complied, but sued.  In the April decision, the court said that Congress had not given the FCC the power to issue the kind of order it did.

The first two “ways” the FCC thought it might proceed, but rejected, after the court ruling were:

–continue to issue orders to ISPs concerning their internet service, and run the risk it would lose in court again and again, or

–declare that it no longer considered ISPs to be “information services” but were actually public utility communication services like fixed-line telephone companies, thereby putting the commissions legal authority over ISPs on a firmer legal footing.

The first would be an exercise in futility.  Congress appears to have told the FCC in no uncertain terms that the second alternative was unacceptable.

Hence, the “third” way.

The Third Way

To my mind, the key clause in the wordy Way is:

” Protecting consumers and promoting healthy competition by, for example, providing greater transparency regarding the speeds, services, and prices consumers receive, and ensuring that consumers—individuals as well as small businesses—are treated honestly and fairly;”

In other words, the FCC’s job is to make sure the ISPs make it clear how much they are charging for what service, and that these rate and speed differences aren’t crazy.  This seems to me to be putting the best face possible on the court finding that the FCC doesn’t have the authority to regulate how ISPs control their traffic.  That’s because Congress hasn’t given it to them.  That situation could be changed in an instant,  but by Congess granting the FCC authority. But congress hasn’t done so.

rumored Google-Verizon deal

The story surfaced in the New York Times last week, and is amplified in a Wall Street Journal blog.  I think it’s likely to happen.  The purported agreement would have GOOG paying VZN a fee so that Android-based phones would have priority access to the VZN wireless system.

How is this consistent with net neutrality.  The explanation will turn in what, in my mind, is a semantic trick.  In the Comcast-BitTorrent instance, Comcast was implicitly offering two levels of service–regular and slow.  BitTorrent got the second, everyone else the first.  Although it’s understandable why Comcast would act the way it did, and the court said the company was within its legal rights to do so, advocates of net neutrality worry that this is the thin end of a wedge that would allow IPSs to slow down anyone’s access.  That would be a bad thing.

GOOG-VZN seem to want to define a third tier of service, call it “premium” or “extra-fast” or something like that, that’s faster than regular.  They will presumably argue that for GOOG to pay for this for Android phones is not a violation of net neutrality because no one in particular is being singled out for getting slower service.

The FCC Third Way manifesto suggests this argument will fly with it.  Newspaper reports suggest Congress will give a thumbs-up as well.

investment implications

First, let’s see if this actually happens.

It seems to me that a development like this is bad for AAPL’s iPhone, by giving the already attractive Android platform another positive attribute.  One might even imagine circumstances where GOOG would be willing to pay ATT for premium service on that network, forcing AAPL to either follow suit or maybe try to preempt with a larger payment.

In my earlier post on the court decision, I said that as a growth investor, my preferred way to try to benefit would be to buy makers of internet access devices.  If a GOOG-VZN deal emerges, an equally good (or maybe better) path will likely be through cash-rich content providers or through healthy ISPs.