stocks in lockstep: what’s going on

US stocks have been travelling more or less in a herd–with, statistically speaking,  little to distinguish he performance of one individual issue from the next.  This sort of thing often happens at the start of a bull market, not almost five years in.

In other posts I’ve described 2013 as a year of “normalization” of the stock market.  During bear markets, fearful investors shift their focus from buying stocks based on anticipated earnings a year or so in the future to concentrating on reacting to actual earnings as they’re released.  Normally, six months or so into a recovery investors begin to reverse this stance and begin to value stocks based on (higher) future earnings rather than historicals.  During this period the market’s price earnings multiple expands.

After the Great Recession, that didn’t happen until 2013.  It took almost four years, plus two years of Treasury security losses–and the expectation that the returns from fixed income would remain negligible for a considerable time to come–for many investors to be willing to take the risk of investing in stocks again.

I think three points are important:

1.  It seems to me that any cyclical asset allocation shift away from bonds has already run its course.  Individual Baby Boomers, who hold much of the wealth in the US, have a distinct age-appropriate preference for income-generating investments. So they’re going to continue to hold some bonds, no matter how poorly they perform.   Also, in what I expect will be a flattish year for stocks, there will be little pain-induced motivation from equity gains to make further asset allocation shifts.

In addition, institutional investors appear to have reached their maximum allowable allocation to equities after a year in which the performance differential between stocks and bonds has been massive.  They may actually be forced to sell equities–although my sense is the reason institutions continue to hire hedge funds (despite a decade of continuous horrific underperformance of traditional managers) is to get around their investment guidelines by reclassifying equity exposure as “alternative” investments.

–I’ve believed for some time that the Great Recession shattered individuals’ belief in the merits of actively managed equity mutual funds.  A shift to index products, ETFs or mutual funds, would explain why stocks have risen across the board.  True, many hedge funds are run by former traders who lack the skill to analyze individual stocks, so they’re index-only players, too.  But that’s been true for years.  Their behavior doesn’t explain why there was less differentiation among stocks in 2013 than in 2010 or 2011.

–Last year’s homogeneity sets up a potential bonanza for stock pickers this year.  There may be some segments of the stock market–the 100 largest names by market cap?  the top 200?– where the asset allocation mindset will continue to dominate, however.  My guess is it will be better to look among smaller names and among stocks that have short histories being publicly traded.  But the important thing for now is to pay attention to the market’s behavior as we get through the quirks of January and into a more normal market next month.


why stocks moving in lockstep in 2013 was unusual

Speaking in very general terms, the stock market is the place where the hopes and fears of investors meet the objective characteristics of publicly traded companies and express themselves in the prices and price movement of little pieces of paper.  In today’s world, it’s really the movement of electronic impulses.

More prosaically, supply and demand meet and express themselves in stock prices.

Investors are a diverse lot.  We range from day traders to those with five-year horizons.  There are institutions and individuals, professionals and amateurs, market timers and the always fully invested, the purely rational (a rare breed) and the highly emotional, the risk averse and even a few risk takers.  (A pedantic note:  a risk taker transacts in order to acquire risk;  he doesn’t care about return.  A risk averse person transacts when he sees a favorable risk/reward relationship.  What counts as favorable can very widely.)

Despite this diversity, there are recognizable patterns to stock investment.  One of them is the way stocks behave at different points in the business cycle.

–stocks in the US tend to start to rise, often very sharply, about six months before the business cycle begins to turn up

–once investors who have been sitting with cash on the sidelines realize that the market has turned, they start to shift that idle cash into stocks.  They may do so by buying stock index futures, or they may buy individual stocks–or both.  In any event, their main goal is to get a lot of money on the train as fast as possible.  Getting the best possible seat can come later.

Not every investor is like this.  But there are enough trying to get very large amounts of money reallocated into stocks at the most favorable prices that buying is pretty much across the board.

During this period, stocks are relatively closely correlated.

–as this initial surge into the market subsides, the market gradually shifts toward differentiating among stocks based on their anticipated growth rates and on their pricing.

In other words, as the business cycle matures, stocks become less correlated with each other.  The style-agnostic shift from value stocks to secular growth names.

what makes 2013 strange

2013 was the fifth year of the bull market.  Yet stocks were more highly correlated with each other than they were in 2009 or 2010.  Given the way the stock market usually works, the opposite should have been the case.

Tomorrow:  what I think is going on.

stocks were “unusually highly correlated” last year–meaning? implications?

A number of brokers have pointed out in their yearend reviews of the US stock market that stocks were unusually highly correlated with one another last year.  What does this mean?

Think of a stock as an abstract thing, as a bundle of different economic attributes or characteristics that you get when you buy it.  Some of these attributes–like that you get an ownership interest in a corporation that aims to make continually growing profits–are common to all stocks.  Others–that the underlying company you own an equity interest in makes yoga pants, mines gold, or sells online advertising, and grows faster/slower than most–are specific to that stock.

The “highly correlated” observation means that, much more than usual, what counted in 2013 was the fact the thing you own is a stock; its individual characteristics didn’t make much difference.  Check out my Keeping Score for December 2013 to see how closely aligned the performance of various industry groups was last year.

Note how clustered together the various sectors are around the S&P.  In simple terms, an investor got +30% just for owning the S&P 500.  He got an extra 8 percentage points for selecting Healthcare, and he lost 7 if he picked Energy.  But neither decision meant anything close to as much as just being in stocks.

Yes, there were two truly poisonous sectors, Telecom and Utilities, which just barely made it into the plus column for 2013.  These two sectors together make up only about 5% of the S&P, however.  So from a statistician’s point of view, they’re irrelevant.  That’s cold comfort for someone who bet the farm on either sector last year, although I think you’ve got to admit that being absent from 95% of the market is an extremely risky thing to do.

Tomorrow:  why is the 2013 outcome is strange.