vendor financing and Carly Fiorina

prelude

The leaders in the race for the Republican presidential nomination are both deeply flawed business people.   Both are brilliant marketers.  Both are, paradoxically, running–successfully–on their “records” in business, something that alternately bemuses and appalls the financial community.

The Trump case is complex: excessive use of leverage that all but destroyed the family real estate business in the late 1980s, followed by a successful decades-long struggle to rebuild what was lost.

The Fiorina record is less so:  her tenure at Hewlett-Packard is best summed up by the fact Fortune magazine points out that HPQ stock gained almost $3 billion in market value the day she was fired.

As her poll numbers continue to rise, however, attention is beginning to shift to Fiorina’s tenure at Lucent, a spinoff from ATT that included Bell Labs and ATT’s telecom infrastructure business.  Lucent was a stock market darling in the late 1990s, but collapsed in the early 2000s under an accounting scandal surrounding vendor financing.  Fiorina, who became CEPO of HPQ in 1999, was long gone by then.  But the question is beginning to surface as to what role she played in promoting vendor finance at reckless levels before she left.

So I figured I’d write about what vendor financing is.

vendor financing

I’ve found that a good way of gauging competitive strength is by looking at how quickly a company gets paid for its goods or services.   On the positive end of the conceptual spectrum is the firm that gets paid in full before it makes or delivers stuff.  On the far negative side is the outfit that either gives its products/services away or pays you to take them.

Vendor financing falls much nearer to the negative pole.  It isn’t simply giving customers 180 days to pay.  Vendor financing is long-term loans given to customers by a firm to induce the purchase of that company’s very expensive capital equipment.  In Lucent’s case, vendor financing involved multi-billion dollar deals for telecom infrastructure equipment.

At first blush, there’s nothing wrong with this.

The company providing vendor financing may have a lower borrowing cost than a customer.  So one could argue that this is a relatively harmless way of providing a product discount.  In addition, the fact that a customer doesn’t have to line up bank financing makes it easier for a super salesman to close deals–and lock up clients–in a very short time.  In the land rush to stake out territory in the fast-growing mobile phone infrastructure, it became a staple of dong business in Europe and emerging markets in the 1990s.

Even in its most benign form, however, vendor financing has issues.

It makes company profits look better than they otherwise would be.  Let’s say, for example, my list price is 100, on which I earn an operating profit of 50.  If my customer asks for a discount of 10 to seal the deal, my sale would be 90 and my profit 40.  If I counter with 100 plus cheap long-term financing, then I still show sales of 100 and a profit of 50, even though I’m giving a discount.  The loan I provide simply sits on the balance sheet and has no effect on profits.  So I’ve hidden the discount and inflated my profits.

Like most financial things, vendor financing didn’t remain in its benign form for long.

Telecom vendors soon began offering financing to firms that wouldn’t be able to arrange commercial bank loans.  Then they began to offer loans that would be impossible for customers to repay  …and/or for more equipment than they could ever possibly use.

Lucent was eventually charged by the SEC with accounting fraud.

 

In an extremely carefully written article on the front page of the New York Times yesterday, Andrew Ross Sorkin reports that Fiorina was involved with a multi-billion dollar Lucent vendor loan to a company called PathNet that had less than $1.6 million in annual revenue (shades of Solyndra)–something that came up in her unsuccessful Senate run in California.

bond funds when interest rates are rising (ii)

Yesterday I referenced an article in the Wall Street Journal that talked about possible liquidity problems with junk bond funds as rates begin to rise. Based on information provided by Barclays, a huge provider of ETFs, the reporter, Jason Zweig, concluded that junk bond ETFs are a safer alternative to traditional mutual funds.

My comment from yesterday, boiled down perhaps to the length it should have been, was that since the first junk bond crisis in the late 1980s, junk bond funds have adopted very rigorous pricing mechanisms, so the chances a junk bond fund is badly mispriced are very small.  On top of that, mutual fund companies have lots of tools available to deal with high levels of redemptions.

 

As to ETFs, while as a practical matter it may be that these vehicles themselves may not be subject to the same selling pressures as traditional mutual funds, the way that ETFs insulate themselves can be an issue for you and me.

In the case of traditional mutual funds, we buy and sell directly with the fund, once daily, after the close, at NAV.

ETFs are considerably more complicated.   We deal with broker intermediaries who make a continuous market throughout normal trading hours, though with no guarantee about how closely the bid-asked spread they set will match up to net asset value.  (Authorized participants, who typically deal in minimum blocks of 50,000 shares are the only ones who transact directly with ETFs.)

The tendency of ETF market makers in times of market stress is to widen the bid-asked spread.  This does two good things for the broker.  He gets a higher return for transacting at a risky time.  And the wider spread discourages people from trading.  Translation:  liquidity for you and me dries up.

How bad can it get?  I don’t know.  Several years ago I tried to collect data on the performance of stock ETFs at the market bottom in early 2009.  The only information available then was a comparison of the last trade on  given day with the NAV calculated after the NY close.  In one case, for a foreign stock ETF, the last trade was at a 12% discount to NAV.  The discount may have been considerably wider during the day.  At that time, ETF companies told me they just didn’t know.

I haven’t checked since. I haven’t done this for bond funds.  And one might argue that the 12% discount is an outlier. But the horrible problems ETFs had during the last week of August suggest to me that the situation hasn’t changed for the better.

My experience is that trying to trade during highly emotionally charged times is usually not a good idea.  But it also seems to me that the potential risks inherent in trading in mutual funds at times like this to you and me, not to the fund company, pale in comparison to those involved with ETFs.

 

This has gotten much longer than I intended.  More tomorrow.

 

 

 

bond funds when interest rates are rising

This past weekend, the Wall Street Journal published an article in its Business and Finance section about what happens if interest rates rise and holders of bond mutual funds and ETFs start to sell in large amounts.  The article is based on a research report written by Barclays and co-authored by that firm’s co-head of fixed income research, Jeff Meli.  The article isn’t identified further.

Maybe that’s not so strange, since, as reported in the WSJ, I find the research itself to be weird.  Its conclusions seem to me to be either not that relevant or just plain wrong.  The article does, however, touch on a number of points that are important for bond fund holders to consider.

 

The report starts out by assuming what I guess the researchers think is a worst-case scenario:  the junk bond market drops 10% in a day, and a given mutual fund receives requests for redemptions equal to 20% of its assets.

It concludes that:

–the fund’s net asset value would fall by 12%

–the fund would sell its most liquid assets to meet redemptions

–the remaining assets would be mispriced at a value higher than the value they could be sold at

–therefore, the first investors to leave would receive more than fair value and would be the best off; later redeemers would get less than fair value for their shares

–ETFs don’t have these problems and should be preferred to mutual funds.

my thoughts

I think this is a very unlikely set of circumstances.  The most damning constraint would seem to be the “single day” provision, which is intended to give the junk bond manager in question the least possible time to raise funds to meet redemptions.  However, the other two conditions haven’t come anywhere close to being triggered on a single day, either in the downturn following the internet bubble or during the 2008-09 recession.  Some kind of gigantic external shock to the economy would seem to be necessary for either to happen– not something specific to a given type of asset.

In such a case, it’s not clear that any financial markets would be functioning normally.  It’s conceivable that trading in many/all financial instruments would be halted until calm was restored.  So the pricing of a given junk bond fund would be a moot point.

For at least the past quarter-century, junk bond funds have generally been priced by third parties at “fair value.”  I’ve seen them work for illiquid stocks or for NY pricing of stocks trading abroad.  My judgment is that they work incredible well.  So I don’t think fast redeemers get the best pricing.  The opposite may well be the case.

Fund families have lines of credit that they can use to meet unanticipated redemptions.

No portfolio manager worth his salt is going to sell only the most liquid assets first.  On the contrary, it’s better to sell illiquid ones while there are still buyers.

In the past, big investment companies have ended up buying the most illiquid assets from junk bond funds they manage at a price determined by a neutral third party, in order to make redemptions easier and shore up confidence in the fund.

In general, fund management companies have no incentive to price a fund too high.  If anything, they should want to price it too low.  That way, they can send the extra to redeemers once they find their error.  No one is going to send anything extra back.

I don’t get the ETF stuff at all.

More tomorrow.

 

What Janet Yellen did/didn’t say yesterday

Yesterday the Fed announced that its Open Market Committee had decided to postpone, yet again, beginning to raise interest rates from their current intensive-care lows.

In her press conference following the decision, Jane Yellen cited several reasons :  the recent rise in the dollar, a plateauing of consumer spending in the US and worries that the authorities in China might be bungling their way through the necessary change in that economy from export-led growth to one that’s led by domestic demand.  (Ms. Yellen pointed to recent ructions in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as evidence for the last.  Personally, I don’t think this is correct.  I see those markets’ rise and fall as what almost inevitably happens when a country allows margin borrowing for the first time.)

Whatever the motivations, the fact remains that the Fed sees the current situation in the US as too risky to warrant even a miniscule rise in short-term interest rates.  …and this is despite six years of economic growth and increasing employment since the economy bottomed in 2009.

What isn’t being said here?

Two things, I think:

–after Japan’s financial collapse in 1989-90, that country twice tightened economic policy prematurely–once by raising interest rates, a second by raising taxes.  The result of these miscues was a quarter-century of deflation and economic stagnation.  The Japan example suggests that in a slow growth environment with no inflation the risks of policy tightening are much larger than most people in the US suspect.

–governments have two main tools to influence GDP growth:  monetary (changes in the price or availability of credit) and fiscal policy (changes in spending and/or taxes).  Fiscal acts slowly but lays the general foundation for growth and indicates a broad direction for expansion.  Monetary acts relatively quickly and is most useful for mid-course corrections, slowing or accelerating the pace.  A dysfunctional Washington has meant that, other than the bitterly contested bank bailout plan in 2009, fiscal policy has done virtually nothing useful to stimulate growth over the past half-decade (arguably, it’s a mild deterrent).  Nor is it likely that Congress, now winding up to shut the government down, will change its stripes.  This implies that the Fed has no backstop if it makes a policy mistake.

 

Nothing about either is particularly new news.  But the Fed decision calls attention the major structural difficulties the US economy faces.  This is not a recipe for having stocks go up.

what would $20 a barrel oil mean for stocks?

Yesterday I wrote about the recent Goldman report speculating that oil might fall to $20 a barrel.

What would this mean for stocks?

a $40 ceiling…

To my mind, the most important observation is the simplest–the potential price fall would be caused by more oil being supplied than the world wants or needs or is able to store profitably for future use.  The price would decline to force marginal production off the market.

In other words, there’s significant oversupply at $40 a barrel.  Therefore, $40 becomes the new ceiling for oil, which would presumably bounce between it and the floor of $20.  The $60-$70 a barrel level, which markets now believe to be the near-term price ceiling, becomes a pipe dream.

…that would be hard to break through

Yes, demand for oil has been showing a trend rise of about 1% per year, and a lower price will encourage higher use but since the extent of oversupply is hard to know for sure, the safest assumption, I think, is that it would take a looong time to break through the $40 ceiling.

substitutes are hurt

A lower oil price makes substitute forms of energy–from coal and natural gas to nuclear to wind and solar–relatively less attractive.  In the US, we’ve already seen demand for automobiles is shifting away from fuel efficiency to gas guzzling because of $40 a barrel oil.  This trend to would likely accelerate if oil falls more.  Of course, by spurring more profligate use of oil, this trend should sow the seeds for future oil price increases.  Still, my guess is that upward price pressure takes a long time to develop.

producers vs. consumers

countries

Lower prices would be a boon for oil-consuming nations.  For developing countries dependent on oil production for economic growth, however, lower prices would force significant–and possibly very politically messy–structural change.  We’re already seeing this in Saudi Arabia, for instance.

industries (in the US)

Financially strapped oil producers would be in worse trouble than they are now.  Bad, too, for oil-related junk bonds.  The same for regional lenders specializing in oil and gas loans.

Seen from 30,000 feet, the US is a complex economic case.  Shale oil has allowed the country to displace Saudi Arabia as the #1 oil producer in the world.  On the other hand, the US is nevertheless a huge importer of foreign oil (per capita, we use twice as much oil as anyone else on earth).  While oil-producing regions–Alaska, Texas, Oklahoma, North Dakota…–would suffer from lower oil prices, the rest of the country would have its already low oil bills cut in half.

stocks

the minus column

oil producers

producers of other forms of energy

companies located in oil-producing regions

the plus side

US auto firms

oil refiners

transport companies, like airlines and truckers

consumer companies, helped by the boost to disposable income from less spent on petroleum products

??strip malls, Wal-Mart, resort destinations, other firms consumers typically drive to

businesses serving less affluent customers, who would have the greatest percentage boost to disposable income