Yesterday I mentioned a Factset article about the trading behavior of China-related ETFs during the current market gyrations in Shanghai and Shenzhen. It focuses on the Deutsche X-trackers Harvest CSI 500 China-A Shares Small Cap ETF (ASHS). Quite a mouthful.
ASHS opened for business last year and has about $41 million in assets. Its goal is to track the performance of 500 Chinese small caps. It holds all of the names in the appropriate proportions, to the extent that it can. Where it can’t, it finds the best proxies available.
Year to date through yesterday, ASHS has risen by 37%+.
The fund melted up in mid-June, however. Its price rose by 40% from June 8th through June 10th alone, at which time it had y-t-d performance of +113%.
The bottom fell out in the following month, when ASHS lost slightly more than half its value–before bouncing back up by +30% over the past few weeks.
Two points about ASHS:
1. The fund uses fair value pricing, which is the industry norm in the US. Fair value pricing, usually performed by a third party the fund hires, does two things:
—-it adjusts the prices of foreign securities in markets that are closed during New York trading for information that has come to light after their last trade, and
—-it gives an estimate for the value of securities that are not trading for one reason or another on a given day.
(Note: in my experience, both types of adjustment are surprisingly reliable.)
This second feature has doubtless come in handy over the past couple of months, since there have been days when as many as half of the Chinese small caps haven’t traded.
2. A mutual fund transacts once a day, through the management company, after the market close and at Net Asset Value.
In contrast, an ETF like ASHS trades continuously during the day, through a number of broker dealers (Authorized Participants), and not necessarily at NAV.
The idea is that these middlemen will use the very cheap brokerage record systems for fund transactions, thus keeping administrative costs down–and that the brokers will use their market making and inventory capability as a way of minimizing the daily flows in and out of the ETF portfolio.
In June, this worked out in an interesting, and ultimately stabilizing way for ASHS.
As I mentioned above, the market price of ASHS rose by 40% over two days in mid-June. We know that, according to Chinese trading rules, the stocks in the portfolio itself could rise in value by at most 10% daily, or 21% over two days. I can’t imagine the ASHS fair value pricing service decided that the portfolio was actually worth 40% more than two days earlier when the market signal was twenty-ish. If I’m correct, the broker dealers decided to meet (presumably large) demand for ASHS shares by letting the premium to NAV expand substantially …by 20%?…thereby choking some of the demand off, rather than issue a ton of new ASHS shares at a lower price.
According to Factset, the brokers did create new shares. But they apparently lent at least some of them to short sellers, who sold them in the market, further tamping down demand.
So the Authorized Participants performed their market-making function admirably–presumably making a boatload of money in the process. But this situation illustrates that the worst fears of possible ETF illiquidity in crisis times may be overblown.