Great Moderation 2.0??

I stole this leadline from the FT blog of Gavyn Davies, hedge fund manager, former head of the BBC and, before that, a Goldman economist. Davies, in turn, lifted it from economist John Normand of JP Morgan.

Great Moderation 1.0

“Great Moderation” is what people began calling the period from 1984 (the recovery year after the two major oil crises of the 1970s) through 2008 (when the world financial system almost melted down).  The idea was very highly conceptual and self-congratulatory–one of those end-of-history, we’ve-reached-Nirvana sort of things.  Modern economics, it was asserted, had finally reached the point where it could control the business cycle.  Never again would developed economies overheat badly; never again would they experience deep recessions.

Obviously, this was wrong, as events of 2008-2010 proved.

In hindsight, the manual labor-intensive parts of Western economies were suffering severe structural damage as China emerged as a global economic power.  “Moderation” was being achieved only through an inappropriately loose money policy implemented by Alan Greenspan, and Mr. Greenspan’s failure to carry out his responsibility to supervise mortgage lending in the US.  For their part, the US banks, freed by Congress from the shackles of Glass-Steagall in 1989, were engaging in widespread, highly lucrative, mortgage fraud.   That enabled wild overbuilding of the domestic housing stock–employing all those displaced manual workers.

Then the music stopped.

Great Moderation 2.0

GM 2.0 is a different sort of animal, though.  The idea this time is that developed economies are barely out of intensive care, so they can’t get much sicker.  And, for the same reason, the energy necessary for wild partying just isn’t there.

The upshot of all this is that the world is in for a protracted period of slow but steady growth, with low inflation and without any sharp lurches downward.

The implications for equity markets are relatively favorable, I think.

The stock market in a slow-growth world would likely have two characteristics:

–mature companies in this sort of environment will grow mainly by taking market share away from others in its industry.  Me-too firms, whose chief virtue has been the ability to rise with the tide, will likely struggle, while innovators prosper.

–rapid growth will be hard to come by.  Firms in new areas or with genuinely novel products will be scarce and should therefore be highly prized.  Maybe not to the loony tunes level that many had soared until recently.  But, if correct, GM 2.0 is a strong argument for beginning to sort through the rubble sooner rather than later.

 

dividend-paying stocks

Robert Rhodes of Rhodes Holdings LLC made one of his usual astute comments about my post last Thursday on utility stocks.  In this post, I’m going to elaborate on my view of buying stocks for their income.

Financial planning guides often mention that when selecting a stock because of its dividend, one should consider not only its current yield but also the potential for the payout to grow.  My impression is that the authors don’t just want to steer us away from too-good-to-be-true extremely high current yields, which are most often a sign that the market thinks the dividend is likely to be cut sharply or even eliminated.  I think they also believe it’s better for investors to pick a stock with, say a 3% current yield and the possibility of 8% annual growth in the payout vs. a stock with a relatively secure 6% yield and no dividend growth potential.

For a Millennial, who arguably has no business getting involved with income stocks, the expert advice is probably correct.  In contrast, for a senior citizen looking for income-generating investments to support retirement, the 3% yield + the promise of growth is certainly better than Treasuries.  But for a seventy-something a good argument can be made that the 6% current yield is the better choice.   At least, that’s what I’ve thought until very recently.

my reasoning?

The handy-dandy rule of 72 tells us that a 3% yield growing at 8% per year doubles in nine years (72/8).  It takes that long for the payout to equal the 6% dividend of the non-grower.  This also means someone who buys $100 worth of the 3% yielder collects $40.50 over the nine-year period, assuming the payout increases at a uniform rate.  The person who chooses the 6% yielder collects $54.  It takes the former another two years+ to draw even in terms of total income received.

Put a different way, the superiority of the 3% yielder with growth doesn’t come into bloom until over a decade after purchase.  That’s a long time.  It hasn’t been clear to me that financial planners fully appreciate how large/long the shift in income is away from the period a senior citizen may be young and healthy enough to enjoy the money.

Capital gains?  In theory, the steady-state 6% yielder has significantly less capital gains potential than the 3%er.  But who knows?  Arguably the senior citizen is more concerned with preservation of income than in making capital gains.  It’s also possible that the sprier utility won’t be able to sustain profit expansion for such a long time.

my change of heart

As I wrote last week, the negative effects of years of downward regulatory pressure on utility rates in mature areas, and the consequent corporate response of cutting maintenance/replacement are starting to become apparent.  It’s no longer clear to me that the dividend payments of no-growth utilities are as rock solid as I’ve been assuming.  So, yes, there’s a chance that the fast grower will slow down in short order.  But I now think there’s also a good chance that mature utilities will be forced to divert large amounts of cash flow away from shareholders in order to shore up creaky infrastructure.  So the mature utilities may be much riskier than they appear.

 

Current Market Tactics, March 12, 2014

I’ve just updated Current Market Tactics.

Maybe a correction isn’t in the offing.  Too bad.  On the other hand, upside momentum seem to me to be waning.

third-party endorsements: why experts appear on financial tv/radio

the 95/5 rule

I was driving through a rural part of southern New Jersey last week and listening to Bloomberg Radio on XM.  The program I was listening to got me thinking about my first job as a full-fledged portfolio manager. On my first day (in 1984), my boss pointed to a three-foot high stack of research reports that she had received in the mail that morning.  This was an everyday occurrence, she said.  95% was trash; part of her job–and now mine–was to read through a pile like that each day looking for the 5% that wasn’t.

Something like that is why I was listening to Bloomberg.

Once in a while, though, a genuine financial expert will appear on one of the Bloomberg shows.  The interviewer will ask intelligent questions–or at least allow the expert to speak, rather than filling the air with the host’s views.  The guest will give interesting and useful answers.  This isn’t the norm.  But it happens.  Hence my thoughts about my old boss’s 95/5 rule.

But why do really knowledgeable guests appear on financial tv/radio?  Why do they fawn on their hosts in the clear attempt to be invited back?

third-party endorsements

The answer is that an analyst or portfolio manager’s appearance on TV or radio legitimizes him to his clients in a uniquely powerful way.

This doesn’t make an enormous amount of sense.  But it’s true, nonetheless.

The client may understand that the media personalities don’t have a particularly deep knowledge of finance.   Some have had past brushes with the law.  A few have clearly adopted a entertainment-first attitude, and make no pretense of preparation or expertise.

The client may also realize that the guest may only have been invited to appear on a show because his firm is a big advertiser.

Still, the appearance on tv or radio can carry as much weight with that client as the manager’s track record.  For retail investors, it carries more weight than the numbers.  Even better if the manager is a frequent guest or if the interviewer says nice things about him.

The bottom line:  despite evidence to the contrary, people believe the financial press is objective and knowledgeable.  At the same time, people generally distrust marketers who work for, i.e., are paid by, an investment manager.

Therefore, a press endorsement–a favorable mention in a newspaper or magazine article, an interview on tv or radio–is a huge help in selling the interviewee’s investment services.  So experts–and non-experts, as well–have a strong financial interest in courting the media, flattering the interviewers and generally twisting themselves into pretzels, if need be, to appear in print or on shows.

 

growth investing and “The Investment Answer”

Yesterday I skimmed the short but valuable book The Investment Answer, by Goldie and Murray.  The late Mr. Murray was an institutional salesman for a number of brokerage firms;  Mr. Goldie is a fee-only investment adviser.

The book, which I think is well worth reading, contains lots of financial planning basics, laid out in clear, simple language.   The first chapter, which deals with the traditional registered representative, is particularly good.

The only real quarrel I have with The Investment Answer is the chart it contains which asserts that value investing generates higher returns than growth investing.  This is a common belief, reinforced by numerous academic studies which claim to “prove” this.

I think this claim is just wrong.

But I had a long, and relatively successful career as a growth stock investor, so of course I’m going to think this.

Worse than that, however, I suspect that demographic and technological change are undermining the fundamental pillars of the traditional value investing style.

About those studies–

–the typical procedure is for an academic to take a universe of stocks, say the S&P 500, and divide it into two parts.  The “value” part will consist of stocks with the lowest price-earnings ratios, lowest price-to-cash-flow ratios and lowest price-to-book-value ratios, all based either on historical data or on consensus Wall Street estimates (in the case future-oriented information is also used).  Put another way, these are the cheapest stocks, based on consensus beliefs.  The “growth” part will be everything else, meaning all the expensive stocks.

The studies then show that the cheap stocks perform better than the expensive ones.  What a surprise!?!

What’s wrong here?  It’s the definition of value vs. growth.  The studies assume the difference is between two mutually exclusive groups separated from one another using a single set of rules.

The reality is that growth and value are not mutually exclusive.  They’re two different ways of looking at the investment world.

The growth investor looks for stocks where he believes the consensus view is mistaken, either by underestimating how fast earnings will grow and/or how long this superior earnings performance will last.  A growth investor may hold many stocks that the academic classifies as “value” (think: the AAPL of a few years ago);  there are many that the academic classifies as “growth” that no self-respecting growth investor would touch with a ten-foot pole.

Why don’t growth investors kick up a fuss about this academic nonsense?  It’s not in their best interest.  Why show your trade secrets for everyone to see?  That would just make your job harder.

More tomorrow.