Intel (INTC) and Altera (ALTR)

Late last Friday afternoon a rumor reached Wall Street that INTC is in talks to acquire ALTR, causing a sharp rally in ALTR shares and a modest one in INTC’s.  In hindsight, INTC appears to have been headed down this path for a couple of years, as a prescient article in the Electronic Engineering Journal (titled “When Intel Buys Altera”) pointed out last June.

Why a deal is potentially crucial for INTC:

1.  what ALTR does:  The company is one of the two dominant makers of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)–the other is Xilinx.   FPGAs are logic devices.  What makes them unusual is that they contain software that can be updated, revised or reprogrammed after the servers or telecom equipment (the two big markets for FPGAs) they’re in have already been built and installed.  The traditional upside of FPGAs is that they allow customized equipment to be put into the field and fine-tuned quickly.  Their downside is they’re more expensive than the pure-hardware alternative, ASICs (application-specific integrated circuits).

2.  INTC and Moore’s Law:  A factory to make current-generation INTC chips costs about $3 billion – $4 billion.  A next-generation factory, using much different equipment, will cost maybe $14 billion.  Samsung has already said it will build one; INTC says it’s too risky to build one by itself.  How, then, does INTC retain its technology/speed advantage over rival chipmakers?

3.  an INTC chip + a FPGA:  as reported in the EE Journal, INTC says linking an INTC microprocessor with a FPGA in a server can boost performance by 10x.  Bind the interface between the two closely enough can double performance again.

In other words, INTC + ALTR = huge step forward in chip performance.

why a merger and not a joint venture?

To my mind, the risk to both parties is too high for a joint venture.  INTC would have its lucrative server business in jeopardy if it committed to the FPGA route and the parties ever parted.  ALTR would have to devote a lot of resources to making its programming tools easier to use, potentially diverting attention from its telecoms customers.

More tomorrow.

 

 

downward revision of 1Q15 revenue by Intel (INTC)

Yesterday INTC issued a press release revising downward the 1Q15 guidance it gave when announcing 4Q14 results on January 15th.

The company now expects 1Q15 revenue to be $12.8 billion vs $13.7 billion previously–a drop of about 6%.

What does this mean?

–My impression is that, like most publicly traded companies, INTC provides guidance that gives itself a margin of safety against having a negative surprise.  That is, the guidance is a reasonable figure, given the data at hand, but a little on the low side.  So the downward revision means INTC has used up all its wiggle room and then some.

–The reporting convention is to list the factors behind the revision in the order of their importance, with the most significant first.  For INTC, these factors are:

—–weaker demand for business desktops, and

—–a resulting runoff in the number of INTC chips that wholesalers’ are willing to keep in inventory.  This is magnifying the effect of the retail shortfall on INTC’s sales. (Think:  instead of selling 10 chips and reordering 10, the wholesaler has sold, say, 9 and reordered 8.)

 

–The reasons behind weaker sales–again, most important first–are:

—-slowdown in the rate at which small and medium-sized businesses are replacing their outmoded Windows XP machines

—-economic weakness, especially in Europe

—-currency weakness, especially in Europe.

Operating margins remain unaffected, despite the revenue drop.  That’s because higher selling prices are offsetting the negative effect of lower unit volumes (which would seem to imply that unit volumes are off by 6%).

my take

My guess would be that sales to end users are off by 4% vs. forecast and the other 2% is from reduction in wholesale inventories.  I suspect that these are sales deferred rather than lost, so I’m not too concerned.  This probably does signal, however, that the vast majority of the current corporate upgrade cycle is over.

I’m more interested in currency/volume effects in the EU.  It’s less to figure out what’s happening with INTC than to to get advance warning about how other firms with European exposure may fare as they report results.

I’m guessing, based on their order in the INTC press release, that businesses clinging to XP are 60% of INTC’s problem, 40% is Europe.

If so, Europe accounts for a 2.5% falloff in sales.  Let’s assume that the decline of the euro accounts for half of this, or 1.25% of $13.7 billion, which equals $170 million.  The euro has fallen by 8% since January 15th.  $170 billion/.08 = $2.1 billion, implying that European end users now make up only about 15% of INTC’s sales.

This strikes me as low, although in a quick look through the company’s 2013 10-K (the 2014 one isn’t out yet) the geographical breakout  of operations that I found listed the location of INTC’s computer-building customers, not where the end users are.

Two conclusions, then:

more currency losses than expected for multinationals with European exposure in 1Q15, and

weaker than expected (I think) economic performance in Europe, as well.  Not a disaster, but worse than companies thought two months ago.

 

 

 

 

Warren Buffett’s latest portfolio moves: the 4Q14 13-f

Investment managers subject to SEC regulation (meaning basically everyone other than hedge funds) must file a quarterly report with the agency detailing significant changes in their portfolios.  It’s called a 13-f.  Today Berkshire Hathaway filed its 13-f for 4Q14.  I can’t find it yet on the Edgar website, but there has been plenty of media coverage.

Mr. Buffett has built up his media and industrial holdings, as well as adding to his IBM.  The more interesting aspect of the report is that it shows him selling off major energy holdings–ExxonMobil, which he had acquired about two years ago, and ConocoPhillips, which he had been selling for some time.  Neither has worked out well.

There’s also a smaller sale of shares in oilfield services firm National Oilwell Varco and a buy of tar sands miner Suncor–both presumably moves made by one of the two prospective heirs working as portfolio managers at the firm (whose portfolios are much smaller than Buffett’s.  Buffett has told investors to figure smaller buys and sells are theirs.)

Three observations:

–the Buffett moves would have been exciting–maybe even daring–in 1980.  Today, they seem more like changing exhibits in a museum.

–if I were interested in Energy and thought it more likely that oil prices would rise than fall, I’d be selling XOM, too.  After all, it’s one of the lowest beta (that is, least sensitive to oil price changes) members of the sector.

But I’d be buying shale oil and tar sands companies that have solid operations and that have been trampled on Wall Street in the rush to the door of the past half-year or so.  That doesn’t appear to be Mr. Buffett’s strategy, however.  His idea seems to be to cut his losses and shift to areas like Consumer discretionary. (A more aggressive stance would be to increase energy holdings by buying the high beta stocks now, with the intention of paring back later by selling things like XOM as prices begin to rise.)  NOTE:  I’m not recommending that anyone actually do this stuff.  I’m just commenting on what the holdings changes imply about what Mr. Buffett’s strategy must be.

–early in my career, I interviewed for a job (which I didn’t get) with a CIO who was building a research department for a new venture.  I was a candidate because I was, at the time, an expert on natural resources.   The CIO said the thought there were three key positions any research department must fill:  technology, finance and natural resources.  All require specialized knowledge.    I’d toss healthcare into the ring, as well.  I’d also observe that stock performance in these more technical areas is influenced much less by the companies’ financial statements than is the case with standard industrial or consumer names.

Mr. Buffett is an expert on financials–he runs a gigantic insurance company, after all.  On tech and resources, not so much, in my opinion.  Financials are the second-largest sector in the S&P 500, making up 16% of the total.  Tech makes up 19.5%; Energy is 8.3%; Healthcare 14.9%.  The latter three total 42.7% of the index.  As a portfolio manager, it’s hard enough to beat the index in the first place.  Being weak in two-fifths of it makes the task even harder.

the current earnings season

Two things strike me about the current earnings reporting season for US publicly traded companies:

–the market reaction to reported results, both weak and strong–and to forward guidance as well–has been unusually sharp.  Rises/drops of 10% on news haven’t been uncommon

–much of the data that the market is reacting to has already been in the public domain before the company earnings announcement made it “official.”  This lack of discounting in advance is very unusual.

Qualcomm (QCOM–I’ve owned it in the past but not now) is a good example.  The stock dropped by 9% after the company said that two developments would damage future results:  Samsung will not include a QCOM Snapgragon chip in its next generation smartphone; and QCOM is having trouble collecting royalties in China.  But who didn’t know this already?   The former news has been circulating on the internet for weeks, and the latter was the subject of a full-page in-depth article in the Financial Times three days before the earnings report.

As I was thinking about this last night, it struck me that the last time I can remember similar behavior in the US stock market was in 1991.  Even though economic circumstances are far different then, the 1991 stock market might turn out to be a good template for 2015.

In mid-1990, world markets slumped as Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.  Markets rallied back to their prior levels when the US invaded Iraq in January 1991–but went sideways for most of the rest of the year.

During the sideways time, stocks with their own growth story–that didn’t depend on general economic trends–could do no wrong (fledgling biotechs were rock stars).  Commodity stocks, in contrast, were repeatedly pummelled.  Industrial, or other relatively economically sensitive areas, were trashed as well, though, as I recall, not so badly as raw materials names.

This uncomfortable period came to an abrupt end in late 1991, as signs of a general economic upturn began to be seen.  Biotechs promptly crashed.  Economically sensitive stocks surged.  And the market went from ignoring the future and rehashing current earnings reports to discounting into prices anticipated earnings for 1992 and beyond.

If the 1991 analogy holds true, domestic US companies seem to me to be the current safe haven, while those with EU exposure are in trouble.  Niche companies or special situations will be in their own special nirvana, and economically sensitive ones simmer in purgatory.

Nothing much new there.

The point is that in a 1991-like market the same news gets discounted over and over again for an extended period.  There is no countertrend rally that gives relief to out of favor sectors, no reversal of form for underperforming names.

If I’m correct, the cost of deciding to ride out poor portfolio positioning with the idea of maybe repositioning during a countertrend move will prove more costly than the experience of the past half-decade would lead anyone to expect.

1Q15 earnings for Apple (AAPL)

the earnings report

Last night AAPL reported results for 1Q15 (the company’s fiscal year ends in September).  Earnings came in at $18 billion, up 37% year-on-year.  EPS came in at $3.06, a 48% yoy advance (the difference is due to the company’s aggressive stock buyback program, which has shrunk the number of outstanding shares).  These figures were far in excess of the Wall Street consensus, which was centered around eps of $2.60.

This is the first time in at least two years that AAPL has had a positive earnings surprise this large.  The $18 billion also sets a new all-time record for profits by a publicly traded company.  Lots of positive media reports, focusing on the records shattered.

As I’m writing this, the stock is up almost 8% on the news.

the highlights

I hven’t looked carefully at AAPL quarterly earnings for a whole (there’s been no need to).  I’d almost forgotten the teeth-achingly saccharine quality of the Applespeak the company uses in dealing with the investing public.

More substantive thoughts:

–the Steve Jobs era is over  Jobs left the company with powerful earnings momentum, an upscale image, design flair and the iPod, the iPhone and the iPad.   He also left behind some bad stuff–a dogmatic belief in a tablet size that was too big and a smartphone size that was too small.  After struggling for some time, the company has now thrown off both those mistakes.

–the Apple brand/ecosystem has huge power  Pentup demand for a larger smartphone drove iPhone sales in the  holiday quarter to 74.5 million units, a 46% yoy gain.  Inventories fell to unusually low levels during the period, suggesting sales were constrained by AAPL’s manufacturing capability.  (Stocks are now back at normal levels.)

In other words, even though Samsung and other Android suppliers were offering a clearly superior product, Apple users by and large continued to use their dated phones in the hope that the company would finally come to its senses.  Where else would this happen?  AAPL reported that 1Q15 was the highest period ever for Android users switching to the iPhone, suggesting that the small number of prodigal sons/daughters were returning to the fold.

earnings growth will continue strong  Only a small percentage of AAPL  smartphone owners have upgraded to the iPhone 6  …10%? – 15%? of the total.  This seems to me to imply that AAPL’s yoy earnings comparisons will continue to be healthy for at least the next several quarters, despite a lower dollar value of foreign currency sales.

odds and ends

–Computers were strong for AAPL; tablets were weak

–Sales in Greater China were very good

–The strong dollar means currency was a negative factor in the quarter, even though the raw numbers down’t seem to reflect that.  Currency will continue to be a problem.  Curiously, the yen seems to have been more of an issue than the euro (implying that AAPL hasn’t made much penetration into the EU?).  Hedging will temper currency losses for a while, but AAPL, like most companies, gives little detail on the nuts and bolts of its hedging operations.  So it’s very hard to figure currency effects.  AAPL, however, is guiding to a strong yoy earnings gain in 2Q15 despite this.