Japan joins the QE party

Japan’s QE

Two days ago, the Bank of Japan announced it is following the lead of the ECB and the Fed in launching a new round of Quantitative Easing (a term invented by an economist apparently obsessed with the Queen Elizabeth line of ships).

the EU starts, the US follows

The rationale for the European Central Bank to act is clear.  It is in effect using funds from the stronger EU economies to prop up the bond markets of debt-laden and uncompetitive Spain and Italy while they restructure their economies.

Why QE3 in the US is somewhat less clear.  The Fed is propping up the domestic mortgage-backed securities market, while simultaneously assuring investors that short-term interest rates will remain low for the next three years.   This will certainly be good for housing prices.  Addressing the looming “fiscal cliff,” or, better still, reforming the tax code would be much more effective confidence-building steps.  But these are the province of the White House and Congress.  QE3 is all the Fed can do.

The Fed’s intent is to create more jobs.  These might come either in direct fashion from a new residential construction boom (which wouldn’t be a good thing, in my view), or indirectly from the “feel-good” factor that stable or rising home values would produce.

The Fed realizes its action may do nothing.  But its attitude seems to be that it’s better to light one more candle than to stand by and watch the labor force erode through chronic unemployment (see my post).

Japan’s motivation

Japan’s motivation is murkier still.  If EU and US money policy become looser, then simply by doing nothing Japan’s becomes relatively tighter.  This change won’t make itself felt through lower nominal interest rates, which are close to zero anyway.  But the new tightness should manifest itself in relative strength for the ¥ versus the € and the $.

So far, however, that hasn’t happened.  The ¥ has weakened against its strongest trading rival, the €, and strengthened only mildly against the $.  Nevertheless, the Bank of Japan appears to have chosen to draw a line in the sand for its currency at the level of $1 =¥78.  It’s doing so to assist domestic export-oriented industry.

Yet, the central bank must know that such currency defenses seldom, if ever, work.  And it must realize that currency strength isn’t the main problem. Rather, the Japan Business Association (Keidanren) is lost is dreams of the glory days of a quarter-century ago.  Ex the big auto manufacturers, Japanese exporters haven’t evolved since then.  In newer areas, they have been surpassed by the US, in older sectors by Korea and China.

the essential differences

The ECB is acting because it sees no other choice if it wants to preserve the Eurozone.

The Fed thinks there’s little downside to its actions, and they may do some good.

Both central banks are seeking to stimulate their domestic economies.

Japan, on the other hand, is trying to defend its trade position.  And it’s “buying time” for adjustment for a sector that hasn’t changed in 25 years.  Not a great way to make a living.

From an investment perspective, even though the motivations of the various central banks may be different, the overall effect is that more money is sloshing around looking for a home.  In the near term at least, that’s good for global stock markets.

comparing Japan 1992 with the Eurozone 2012

creating an EU timetable

It seems to me that all of the elements of the Eurozone crisis have been out in the open for some time.

The Papandreou government took power in Greece in September 2009 and triggered the crisis by announcing that the national accounts had been falsified for many years by the prior administration.  Greece, as many had already suspected, was in much worse financial shape than the official figures showed.  But that was 33 months ago!

It has been clear from the outset that financial contagion could easily spread from one member of a currency union to the others.  The rolling nature of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s showed vividly how this could happen, even outside a tight economic linkage of the typce that binds the Eurozone together.

It has also been evident from the beginning that the Eurozone banks were intimately tied to the weaker countries by their large holdings of those countries higher-coupon sovereign debt.  So they were in trouble, no matter what country they were domiciled in.

We’ve also seen the shoes drop, one by one, as market attention has shifted from Greece to Italy to Spain, just like in Asia–and the PIGS countries have revealed the extent of their financial messes.

We’ve recently seen capital flight, as corporate and individual investors have (sensibly) shifted their euros from banks in weaker countries to those in Germany or other stronger ones.

Finally, I think we’ve reached a political tipping point in Germany, where the political cost of not addressing the woes of southern Europe exceeds the cost of taking action.  Hence the recent moves to consider more than austerity as a solution.

for investors, where to from here?   

I’m looking at the situation as a foreign investor, not as a citizen or resident of the EU.  I’m more concerned with the stock market implications of today’s Eurozone situation than the political and economic.

My question, then, is:

when will the EU’s fiscal problems stop being the dominant factor influencing the movements of its stock markets–and the markets of the rest of the world?

looking at Japan in 1989

We do have one example of this kind of situation during my professional lifetime.  It’s the Japan of late 1989.

That’s when the new head of that country’s central bank began to raise interest rates to force the government to bring highly speculative banking and  financial market activity under control.  The subsequent failure of Tokyo to fix its broken economy ushered in the first of Japan’s two (so far, at least) Lost Decades.

To my mind, Japan’s case was at least as bad as the EU’s.  And Japan more or less deliberately–but very clearly–made a bad choice.  It opted to cover up its problems to preserve a traditional way of life and a traditional power structure, rather than to evolve in a way that would gradually fix them.

It’s not a great roadmap, but it’s the best we have.

what happened in the Tokyo stock market?

The main indices peaked in December 1989, as rates began to rise.

They fell until June 1992, 31 months later.

From that point, the Japanese market drifted, with high volatility, for the remainder of the decade.  This ran counter to a rising trend in the equity markets of other industrialized countries.

The most sobering news is that today, twenty years after the initial bottom, the Tokyo market hasn’t recovered an ground.  On the contrary, it’s half its level of June 1992.  Today, it’s an investing backwater, lost in dreams of the 1980s, and with highly restrictive rules against any foreign attempt to change the status quo.

my conclusions

If Japan is any guide, we should be close to the end of the initial downward phase in Europe.  To me, it makes sense to be on the alert for signs of stabilization.

In Japan, the strongest stocks by far after the initial bottom were either multinationals or export-oriented firms.  That is, they were companies headquartered in Japan but with their operations elsewhere.  To the extent the Japanese citizens bought stocks during the first Lost Decade, those are the ones that they–as well as foreigners–favored.  I think the same will be true in the EU.  Companies located in the EU but not in the Eurozone will probably do the best.

The crisis was by no means over in Japan in mid-1992.  In fact, the first inning had barely begun.  But Japan’s problems ceased having a major negative influence on other markets.

Europe is much more entwined in the fabric of world commerce than Japan was in 1992.  The EU may have a tougher time than Japan over the coming years, in the sense that world economic growth will likely not be as strong as it was in the second half of the 1990s.  On the other hand, Japan benefited less from strength elsewhere than the EU is likely to do.  So a general picture for EU stocks–in the absence of a dramatic political evolution of the EU–is probably flattish, with a lot of volatility.

On the crucial question of whether the EU will follow Japan down the same path to economic irrelevance I have no answer.  I didn’t think Japan would be as inflexible as it has been.  But it shows that when a country has deeply ingrained notions of its cultural superiority and the interests of the status quo are very powerful, denial may be the easiest road to follow.

My bottom line:  it’s probably safe to dip a toe in the EU water today, but not much more than that.

A final note:  once Europe leaves center stage, I think market focus returns to economic policy in the US.

Google’s proposed new class of common stock

the C class announcement

Yesterday, in conjunction with its release of 1Q12 earnings, GOOG published a letter to shareholders on its website.  In it, Larry Page and Sergei Brin outline their plans to create a new class of stock–C shares.

On shareholders’ approval, the new C shares will be distributed as a stock dividend, on a one-for-one basis, to all holders of A and B shares.  C shares will be publicly traded on NASDAQ, using a different ticker symbol from the “GOOG” the A shares use.  As will continue to trade, though.

no voting power

The sole difference among the share classes will be in voting power.  Each A share has one vote; each B share, held by corporate insiders, has 10.   C shares will have no votes.

Since holders of B shares–principally Mssrs. Page, Brin and Eric Schmidt–wield over 70% of Google’s voting power, shareholder approval is a mere formality.

Google intends to file full details of the issue with the SEC next week.

why do this?

…to keep voting control of Google in the hands of the current B shareholders.

How could control be lost?

…through a combination of sales by B holders, issuance of new A shares through stock options or acquisitions for stock.

current shares outstanding

According to the company’s 2011 10-K filing, 67.2 million class B shares, representing 672 million votes, were outstanding on December 31st.  258 million As, representing another 258 million votes, were also out.  Employee stock options on just under 10 million new A shares had been granted and remained to be exercised.  (Notably, I think, the stock option count is growing very slowly.  Google only granted options on 718,000 new shares last year.)

Therefore, assuming all stock options grants are exercised, A shares represent 28.5% of the total vote.  Bs represent 71.5%.

implications of the Cs

control structure frozen

The most obvious is that the new class will provide a way for the company to issue potentially large amounts of new shares without altering the current control structure of the company.  Google has already said future employee stock option grants will be for Cs.  Bs continue to rule.

price of the Cs vs. Bs

It’s not clear that the Cs will trade at the same price as the Bs.  Arguably, voting power should be worth something.  But in this case, as the company is currently constituted, the Bs’ votes basically have no value.  So you’d think the two prices should at least be pretty close.

stock options

Stock options don’t seem to me to be a big deal–or any deal at all.  Here’s what I mean:

If we assume all outstanding stock options are exercised, the company currently has a total of 940 million votes.  Bs have 672 million, with 268 million more for the As.

For the moment, let’s ignore the possibility that insiders sell a significant number of Bs to get walking-around money.  Yes, company rules require that Bs be converted into As before being sold, so no outsiders can end up with the super-vote shares.  Bs, therefore, can–and in the past have–disappeared.  And, yes, Mssrs. Page and Brin are halfway through a modest (for them) sell program that goes into 2015.  But put these thoughts to the side.

As things stand now, A shares can only achieve a voting majority if over 672 million are outstanding.  That’s an extra 404 million shares.  At the 2011 stock option issuance rate, the As take over in the year 2575, or 563 years from now.  At the 2010 issuance rate of 1.7 million, the As grab the reins in a mere 238 years, in 2250.

Suppose B holders sell 10% of their stock–because they need a loose $4.4 billion.  That would imply that the Bs outstanding shrink to roughly 6 million and As expand to 275 million.  In this case, the As still need 325 million more shares to take over.  That would happen, at the earliest, toward the end of the next century.

Even for long-term thinkers like Google, dealing with stock options worries can’t be a pressing issue.

stock-based acquisitions

This is the only reason I can see for the C share move.

True, Google has $44 billion+ in cash; operations generated $14 billion+ last year.  But a seller may well prefer stock to cash.  And, of course, a potential acquisition could be very large.  It could also be very large and very sick, needing a big infusion of cash after the purchase.

Yes, the founders’ letter says  “we don’t have an unusually big acquisition planned, in case you were wondering.”  I’m sure that’s true.  But I’d emphasize the word “planned.”  It seems to me that Google may well have decided it needs to make an acquisition of a certain type over the next couple of years and have developed a list of possible candidates. The next step is figuring out how to pay for it–which is what I think Google is doing now.

Who know what such an acquisition might be?  I wouldn’t care to bet on anything.  But I do have a guess, however   …somebody like Sony.  But that company has been such a train wreck for such a long time that I don’t see any percentage in speculating that Google would rescue them.  There are also severe legal obstacles that Tokyo has erected to deter foreign takeovers of its domestic firms.  On the other hand, Sony is a post-WWII upstart, not part of the establishment.  And the company does have TV technology, cellphones, tablets/PCs and the Playstation in tens of millions of homes around the world.

 

 

 

 

a revealing insider trading ruling in Japan

insider trading in Japan

Yesterday’s Financial Times outlines a judgment made last week in a Japanese insider trading case.  The newspaper misses what I think is the main story, however.

the recent verdict

An institutional portfolio manager at Chuo Mitsui Asset Trust and Banking was found guilty of receiving, and acting on, insider information about an upcoming issue of new stock by a publicly listed company.  The PM made ¥14 million ($170,000) for his clients by trading on the tip.

penalties?

They were:

–the PM’s employer, Chuo Mitsui, was fined ¥50,000 ($600)

–there was no requirement of forfeiture of profits illegally made

–no penalty of any type either for the portfolio manager who received the tip or the broker who gave it.

The article goes on a bit about how, in the mysterious way Japan works, the nominal fine may have sent a powerful symbolic message that therefore the penalties may be more severe than a foreigner might suppose.  I think the nominal penalties do send a message, though not in the way the FT believes.

Oddly enough, the newspaper contrasts this fine with the ¥1.15 billion ($14 million) fine levied against Yoshiaki Murakami for trading on inside information about a half decade ago.  But it doesn’t realize that this contrast is the real story.

the Murakami saga

Mr. Murakami is a naive former civil servant who believed traditional Japanese corporations badly needed restructuring.  He formed an asset management company about ten years ago.  Its purpose was to be a gadfly that could prompt corporate/social change, while making money for clients at the same time.  One of Mr. Murakami’s targets–his last–was Nippon Broadcasting System.

Mr. Murakami bought a very large position in NBS.   He approached the company with suggestions about how to improve very weak corporate results.  He also asked for a board seat.

Management ignored Mr. Murakami.  It called on the “usual suspects”–suppliers, customers, domestic institutional investors–for support by buying NBS stock themselves, or at least by refusing to sell to Mr. Murakami.  Effectively isolated, Mr. Murakami approached a somewhat sketchy internet entrepreneur, Takafumi Horie of Livedoor, for aid.

Livedoor told Mr. Murakami in a private meeting that it intended to build a stake in NBS itself.  The declaration made Mr. Murakami an insider of Livedoor.  Despite this–he later claimed he didn’t understand the implications of his inside knowledge–Mr. Murakami bought more NBS.

Livedoor subsequently launched a hostile bid for the company.  It failed.  During the battle, Mr. Murakami realized that traditional holders of NBS wouldn’t tender their stock, so he sold his for a ¥3 billion ($36 million at today’s exchange rate) profit.

Mr. Murakami was charged with insider trading and found guilty.

penalties for Mr. Murakami?

They were:

–a ¥1.15 billion ($14 million) fine

–forfeiture of all profits from selling NBS, which amounted to ¥3 billion ($36.5 million)

two years in jail, later commuted to three years of probation.

why the sharp differences in the two cases?

Why should the punishment for insider trading be so startlingly different in these two cases?

Two factors stand out to me:

–the lesser one is that the Murakami case involved much larger amounts of money–although that doesn’t explain why there was no censure of the Chuo Mitsui portfolio manager or of the broker, and no forfeiture of illegal profits.

–the real difference, I think, is that Mr. Murakami was not part of the establishment.  Worse, he was a critic of the traditional social order.  By exposing its failings, he threatened the status quo.  In contrast, both the broker and the Chuo Mitsui portfolio manager were working within the shadow system of favors and obligations that the establishment uses to feather its own nest and keep itself in power.

the real story

That’s the real story here–stubborn defense of the traditional economic order, even after two decades-plus of resulting economic stagnation.

playing the Japanese stock market today is harder than it seems

how so?

No, it isn’t the frequent market holidays.

It isn’t the semi-visible, semi-not, zaibatsu/keiretsu business links that tie firms together with amazingly strong (to me, anyway) emotional bonds that foreigners find difficult to assess.

It isn’t the fact that for many Japanese company managements–to say nothing of institutional investors–one foot remains in the samurai world.

None of this helps a foreign investor.  But learning a market’s quirks is arguably part of the price of entry a newbie pays everywhere he goes.

the market structure…

No, the biggest problem for a foreigner today is the structure of the market–the selection of stocks available on the Tokyo Exchange.  Despite the fact that Japan is a wealthy nation and the second-largest advanced economy in the world, its market is dominated by the export-oriented manufacturers, plus the suppliers and distributors that support them, whose heyday (ex the autos) was thirty years ago.

…makes Japan look like an emerging country

The market structure is more like what you’d expect from China or India.  It’s also a little like the US circa 1980.  In the US since then, however, junk bond and private equity barons have taken many older, low growth firms private.  Conglomerates have broken up, or spun off their more glamorous parts, in strategies calculated to maximize their value.  Venture capital has brought a host of new firms into the public arena.  Not so Japan.  There are counterculture exceptions:  Uniqlo and the social networking firms come to mind.  But still…

None of this is exactly news.  But it’s the genesis of the dilemma foreigners now face in the Japanese stock market.

today’s problem:  a weakening yen

Newly initiated quantitative easing in Japan is weakening the yen.  That’s making life more difficult for domestic firms that use imported materials.  And it’s also a lifeline for exporters, who use yen-denominated inputs and sell their products abroad.  So Japanese institutions have been selling the former to buy the latter.  Again, no surprise.  It’s what they always do.

The issue for a foreigner is this:

Ex the autos, the exporters are not a particularly attractive picture.  Historically, they’re a pretty sorry lot in terms of making money.  They face intensifying competition from lower-cost rivals in emerging economies.  By and large, managements are hide-bound and unable to commercialize higher tech products they have.  Law and custom defend dysfunctional incumbents against any shareholder attempts at change .  (Think:  Olympus …or Sharp  …or Pioneer  …or Sanyo   …or Casio   …or Sony).

In addition, for a dollar-oriented investor, at least a part–and probably most–of any yen-denominated gains will be offset by currency losses.  Although my general rule is not to get involved in forex hedging, this is an exception.  Whether you like or not, you probably won’t make much money on your Japanese stocks unless you sell the yen.

…which brings up another potential worry.  Exporters usually run substantial currency hedging operations.  In my experience, they’re pretty good at it.  Nevertheless, it’s always possible that exporters have zigged when they should have zagged.

my bottom line

For a long time, I’ve regarded Japan as a special situations market.  Find an outstanding company; buy and hold.  Enduring the current flight from quality is just a cost of doing business.  I have no desire to chase export-oriented names, although while the yen is softening I think exporters will continue to be market stars.  If I were managing dedicated Japanese money, however, I’m sure I’d find myself under performance pressure to do just that.