quantitative easing in Japan: implications

quantitative easing in Japan

With all eyes on Greece, one of the less noticed developments in global securities markets is the recent decline of the ¥ versus the US$.  As I’m writing this on Thursday morning, the ¥ has weakened from a high of ¥76 = US$1 reached on February 2nd to the current ¥80 = US$1.

This is not just the result of one of Japan’s periodic, ultimately fruitless, attempts to intervene in currency markets to temporarily weaken the ¥.  Instead, it’s the currency markets reaction to what appears to me to be a substantial shift toward monetary easing by the Bank of Japan.

Why do so?

After over two decades of minimal economic growth and mild deflation, citizens’ tolerance for political and bureaucratic bungling of Japan’s economic policy seems to me to have finally been exhausted.  Voters are deeply unhappy with the administration of the recently installed Democratic Party of Japan.  But no one wants the Liberal Democrats back either.  There’s serious discussion about forming a third political party–really radical thinking in a country where politics has been dominated by a single party, the LDP, for a half century.

There’s also been talk in the Diet of legislation that would take away from the Bank of Japan its Federal Reserve-like role in setting monetary policy.  This threat appears to be what’s prompted the central bank to launch the new program of quantitative easing.  The BoJ is basically saying that it will continue to inject money into the system in large amounts until inflation reappears.  In other words, the new stance is the Fed’s approach, but on steroids.

implications

In the near term, this policy will likely continue to weaken the ¥, removing one source of pressure on the profits of Japanese export-oriented companies.  It’s already prompting investors in the Tokyo stock market to re-orient their portfolios toward export-oriented stocks.  I don’t think this policy move, by itself, has the slightest chance of removing Japan from the morass in which it has been trapped for many years, however.  And substantial negative consequences may lie down the road.

As anyone who has read me on Japan before knows, I think the fundamental issue for that economy is the ground-level social decision made twenty years ago not to adapt to a changing world, but to preserve the traditional social order even if that meant slower economic growth.  After all, the country did hide its banking problems for a decade.  Despite a shrinking workforce, it doesn’t allow immigration.  Its laws cement the management practices of twenty year ago–and most times the actual managers–in place and defends them from virtually all attempts at change. Iconoclasts risk social censure, or worse.

Sounds a lot like the Eurozone, doesn’t it–one currency, but keep the local power brokers in place?

risks

Without substantial structural pro-growth reforms, what’s likely to happen?

For a while, nothing much.  The character of the stock market will continue to change, as investors shift away from smaller, counter-culture secular growth stocks to larger, older exporters.  But for foreign investors, a large part of any local currency gains will be erased by currency losses.  So it will be even harder to make money in Tokyo than before.

The strategy, however, seems to me to be playing with longer-term fire.  The central government has piled up a huge amount of debt, which it can continue to service both because interest rates are extremely low and because–lacking other investment alternatives–Japanese citizens continue to buy tons of government bonds.  Reemergence of inflation will mean, at the very least, rising nominal interest rates, and therefore rising debt service for the government.  In addition, in an all too rigid economy, inflation may spread relatively quickly and begin to have negative effects on the value of Japanese assets.  If so, Japanese investors may shift their money away from government bonds and toward inflation-protection vehicles, like real assets or foreign securities.  That might lead to further currency weakness and compound the government’s funding problem.  So a sovereign debt crisis, while not imminent, may be ultimately waiting in the wings.

what I’m doing in response

I own two Japanese stocks, DeNA and Gree.  I like them both, although each has taken its lumps as the market orients toward exporters.  I’m certainly not going to add new money to Japan.  And I’ve got to consider whether I lessen my exposure.  If DeNA and Gree didn’t have substantial businesses outside their domestic market, I’d be doing that already.

 

 

TIF’s 4Q11 earnings misstep

background

When TIF reported 3Q11 earnings (Tiffany’s fiscal year, like that of most retailers, ends in January), it lowered its 4Q profit guidance (see my post).

By then, the company had seen sales for virtually the entire month of November and had detected weakness in spending by residents of the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions of the US.  At that time, it still expected a “low-teens percentage increase” in worldwide sales during 4Q11.  But it effectively clipped $.10 from its estimate of per share profits for the year’s final three months, saying it expected to earn $1.48 – $1.58 per share during the period.  That would be 6.3% more than the $1.44 it earned in the comparable period of fiscal 2010.

the weakening holiday selling season

Last week, TIF reported the results of its worldwide sales for November plus December.

The news wasn’t good–especially in the US and Europe.

Rather than the low-teens increase in sales the company had been anticipating, revenues were only up by 7%.

By region, they broke out as follows:

Americas    total sales = +4%,     comp store sales = +2%  (3Q11 comps = +15%)     ←

Asia-Pacific (ex Japan)     +19%, +12%, (+36%)      ←

Japan     +13%, +6%, (+4%)

Europe     +1%, -4%, (+6%).

In the US, sales to residents were down year on year.  Buying by foreign tourists pushed results into the plus column.

In its press release, TIF reduced its eps forecast for 4Q11 by another $.10-$.15.  It now expects to earn $3.60 – $3.65 for the full year.

The stock fell 10% on the news.  Unlike other stocks with negative earnings surprises, TIF hasn’t rebounded.

my thoughts

December must have been a particularly disappointing month for TIF, since management had already revised down its expectations  based on November weakness.

Recent macroeconomic reports are almost universally signalling that the US economy is improving.  In the jewelry industry in particular, Signet reported on the same day as TIF that its same store sales in its Kay business were up +9.8% and in Jared, +10.0%.  Similarly, Zale reported that its non-kiosk US jewelry business had same store sales growth of +9.0%.  Neither is showing anything like the weakness in TIF’s business.

TIF is much farther up-market than either Signet or Zale.  Presumably, that’s the source of the difference.  It looks like TIF’s high-end US customers left their credit cards at home last month.  My guess is that the problem resides in the waning fortunes of executives in financial services and the industries, like legal, which support it.

Look at the Asia-Pacific figures above, as well.  TIF didn’t highlight this area.  Same store sales are still high at +12%. But three months ago they were growing at a +36% pace, or 3x the current rate.

what to do

At last Friday’s price of $59 or so, TIF is trading at 16x fiscal 1011 eps and yielding 2%. That looks cheap to me.

On the other hand, we have only guesses as to what’s causing the current deceleration in company sales.  They’re probably good guesses, but still…

For investors, the more pertinent question is probably when earnings comparisons will begin to pick up again.  My tentative answer is–not soon.  In fact, earnings comparisons could be negative or flat until late in 2012.

So my thoughts remain unchanged from late November.  I don’t feel any need to sell the stock I own, but I don’t think I have to hurry to buy more.  If I didn’t own any I might buy a small part of a position now, but no more than that.

 

a final note on the Olympus scandal

a recap

During the summer, the newly appointed CEO of Olympus, Michael Woodford, followed up on an account in a Japanese magazine of severe financial irregularities at Olympus (TYO: 7733).  He discovered a number of failed M&A transactions involving gigantic payments to obscure companies that disappeared from existence soon after receiving the money.

He was fired for his pains.  He promptly left Japan, saying he feared for his personal safety.  Once in the UK, he disclosed everything to the world financial press.

An independent panel was appointed by the Olympus board of directors to investigate the situation.  The panel determined that Olympus had engaged in speculative “financial engineering (zaitech)“, presumably arranged for it by its investment bankers, starting in the late 1980s.  Like virtually everyone else who did this in Japan, Olympus lost its shirt.  It covered the losses up, again presumably using a service (tobashi) provided by its brokers.  This generated a cycle of progressively larger cover-ups and money-losing speculations that lasted over two decades.  The fake M&A was an attempt to get money to pay off creditors and end the cycle once and for all.

what’s new

Olympus has avoided delisting by providing the Tokyo Stock Exchange with accurate accounting statements by a mid-December deadline.  The “new” Olympus has book value of about a third of what it had previously claimed.

The stock lost about 60% of its value since the Woodford firing.

Two American funds managers appear to have held close to 10% of the company’s stock at the time the scandal broke.

The newest chairman of Olympus appears to me to be proposing that:

–the company’s board needs only a symbolic shakeup (where one or two members make a ritual expression of regret and resign), and

–Olympus should recapitalize by issuing stock to other members of the Fuji group, like Canon or Fuji Film.

my thoughts

Olympus is a typical Japanese technology-related company.  It’s torn between the need for constant innovation to keep up in  an increasingly complex and rapidly evolving world and its presence in a social/cultural environment where preserving the status quo is acknowledged as perhaps the highest goal.

Current management seems to be in the process of arranging a “traditional” solution to Olympus’s problems–one that doesn’t probe too deeply and where a new corporate direction launched by change of management is completely out of the question.  It sounds like other Fuji companies are willing to help this happen.

In other words, business as usual in Japan.

My guess is that this is the most likely outcome.  After all, except for what I think of as counter-culture companies run by younger Japanese, this has been standard operating procedure when companies get into trouble for the twenty-five years I’ve been watching the Japanese stock market.

Any signs that this time will be different should be studied carefully for potential to be a bellwether of change. (I’m not optimistic, though.)

I’m most curious about the foreign professional investors who  held large positions in Olympus.  Didn’t they know anything about Japan?  Did they really think that buying companies with low price to book or price to cash flow ratios would bring the same kind of success it does in the US?  Didn’t they see that this approach has failed time after time in Japan?

Apparently not.

Tiffany(TIF): strong 3Q11 + weak guidance = 8.7% stock drop

the results

TIF reported its 3Q11 (ended October 31st) earnings results before the start of New York trading yesterday morning.  For the three months, the company took in revenue of $821.8 million.  It earned $89.7 million, or $.70 per share.  This represents a 52% increase over the $.46 a share the company earned in 3Q10.  The 3Q11 figure handily beat the Wall Street consensus of $.60 a share, even exceeding the most optimistic estimate, which was $.67.

TIF also continues to buy back stock at around the $65-$66 level.

the guidance

TIF says it expects 4Q11 earnings to come in between $1.48-$1.58 per share.  This represents a (mere) 6.3% increase over the $1.44 per share the company posted for 4Q10.  This guidance falls near the bottom of the 4Q Wall Street analysts’ estimate range of $1.51 – $1.69.  The median estimate, which  may be revised down, has been $1.64.

Just for reference, a year ago TIF guided to eps of $1.29 and reported $1.44.  If we adjust management guidance for possible lowballing of the same magnitude, we arrive at a figure around $1.65.  That would be a year on year gain of 15% or so.

the details

3Q11 business was stellar.  By areas:

–the Americas, 47.9% of TIF’s sales (49.7% a year ago), rose by 17% yoy.

–Asia Pacific, 22.6% (19.6%), was up by 44%

–Japan, 18.1% (19.1), rose by 12%

–Europe, 11.4% (11.6%), was up by 19%.

Strength was in high-end merchandise.

Where’s the problem?

In its guidance, TIF alluded to “recent sales weaknesses” it has noticed in Europe (no surprise there–and it’s still a tiny part of TIF’s overall business) and in the eastern US.  In its conference call, the company said the western US remains strong and buying by foreign tourists continues to be a significant positive.  But it has noticed a slowdown in purchases by domestic customers in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states.  That’s the reason for its relative caution.

my thoughts

On the surface, the Boston-Washington corridor slowdown seems odd.  The just-released National Retail Federation survey (see my post) highlights the Northeast as an area where holiday spending is surging.  However, I’d already heard the same story as TIF’s from another (privately held) luxury retailer doing business along the East Coast.  I’d attributed that to company-specific problems, but it’s sounding like I’m wrong.

What could be the cause?  …pent-up demand from the recession being satisfied over the past year?  …lower bonuses on Wall Street?  …Newt Gingrich taking a lower spending profile (a joke)?

TIF is still projecting sales in the Americas to be up by 15%-20% yoy in 4Q11, but is now expecting the lion’s share of the sales growth to come from buying by foreign tourists.  This contrasts with the 50-50 split the company has seen in sales growth  between locals and foreigners during recent quarters.

TIF is currently earning at a $4 per share annual rate.  This means it’s now trading at a bit over 15x earnings.  That’s an unusually low multiple by historic standards.  It’s also where the TIF management sees considerable value, as evidenced by its stock buybacks.  In addition, Asia Pacific sales probably amount to about a third of revenues, if we factor in sales to tourists in the US and Europe.  Those sales alone seem to me to be enough to grow the entire company’s profits by at least 10% per year.

On the other hand, if US sales of luxury goods to domestic buyers are beginning to flatten out after an extraordinary burst of buying over the past year–and continue flat for a while–then earnings comparisons for TIF over the next few quarters will likely be lackluster.  Any potential bids from European luxury goods firms (I’ve regarded this possibility as very small, in any event) will likely stay on the shelf until the EU’s economic future is less cloudy.

All in all, I’m content myself to wait before adding to my holding.  If I owned no TIF at all, however, I’d be tempted to buy a small amount now and await further developments.

 


a view from fixed income land

My first boss on Wall Street, who taught me securities analysis in the late 1970s, switched to the fixed income arena in the early 1980s.  He runs Jamison and McCarthy Investment Advisors LLC, which manages money for institutions and high net worth individuals.  His most recent quarterly letter to clients gives a polished industry veteran’s view of the current global economic situation.  It’s very worthwhile reading.  (Sans charts), here it is:

Where We Are

Economic setbacks come in many different forms. Some are self inflicted – like those caused by over-investment in business assets (inventories, plant
and equipment) or excess spending by individuals. Others are caused by higher interest rates and tighter lending practices in response to inflation
fears or credit risks. Over a relatively short time, the excesses can be worked off and, as inflation and credit fears abate, credit begins to expand again.
The economy recovers. Wealth and the total value of goods and services quickly surpass their old high water marks.

Then, there are economic declines that fall outside the realm of the usual business cycle downturns. These are the ones that occur after a debt-
fueled boom goes bust – the bubble pops. We have just experienced such a pop – caused largely by over investment in housing, not just in the U.S.
but in many other countries. The resulting credit losses and credit contraction will persist over an extended period. And while the root cause can be
traced to one sector of one economy, the resulting credit contraction will trigger shocks in unexpected places. So, the collapse of the U.S. sub-prime
housing market causes banks in Iceland to default. Then, investors worry whether the financial extended countries around the edges of Europe will be
able to pay their debts. Maybe, you shouldn’t even put much faith in paper currencies at all.

It takes a long time to clean up the aftermath of credit cycle bubbles. For example, in the wake of All-Time Depression, it took over a decade for
Gross National Product to reach the level recorded in 1929.   Japan experienced a credit crisis in the late 1980’s caused by over expansion in the
manufacturing sector. Since 1990, that economy has grown on average 0.8% a year and ten year Japanese government bonds yielded just 1.3%. So, it should come as no surprise to investors that ten-year U.S. bond yields recently dipped below 2% especially since the Federal Reserve recently stated that they plan to keep short term interest rates near zero for two more years.

Few are predicting a Japanese style period of malaise for the U.S. economy. They cite the flexibility of the U.S. labor market, the willingness of
American consumers to borrow to support spending, an entrepreneurial spirit, and actions by the federal government and central banks to spur
spending. Perhaps they’re right but the jury is still out.

Housing

At the core of the recent economic collapse is housing – or specifically, housing speculation that encouraged people to leverage in order to
maximize their gains from rising home prices. Buyers had both solid reasons and strong incentives to play the game. According to data from the
National Association of Realtors, housing prices rose 85% between 1996 and 2005. The Case-Shiller Index of home prices advanced 12% a year from
2001 to 2005. Interest rates were low, home ownership received favorable income tax breaks, and the government mandated rules that made it
easy to qualify for mortgages regardless of income level, assets, or down payment amount.

The U.S. housing sector is very cyclical. In fact, by raising interest rates and choking mortgage credit, the Federal Reserve used housing as a swing
factor in regulating economic growth during most of the post-World War II period. But this housing downturn was different. It wasn’t caused by a
contraction of credit and a reduction in building activity. It was caused by a price collapse. The Federal Housing Finance Administration produces an
index of housing prices based on same home sales extending back to 1975. While there have been slight price declines over a short period, the 16%
decline that occurred during the four years ended June 30, 2011 is an anomaly.

Real estate is a major component of household wealth in the United States. It totaled $18.1 trillion on June 30, 2011. As per statistics compiled
by the Federal Reserve, owners equity in household real estate was $13.2 trillion in 2005.  By June 30, 2011, the equity in homes had fallen to $6.2 trillion. Meanwhile, stock prices were tumbling and interest rates were falling. Both factors eroded the value and earning power of most consumers’
financial assets, like their 401k’s.

The natural reaction to these forces was to curtail borrowing. And that’s just what happened. The borrowing binge of the early 2000’s has been followed by the borrowing bust of the last few years. Since the consumer accounts for two-thirds of the total economy, it’s no surprise that this new found spirit of frugality produced first, a sharp recession and second, a weak recovery.

The housing sector led the way into the current financial quagmire and that’s the place to look for the route out. Higher home prices would do much
to improve consumer sentiment and balance sheets. Recent data from Case/Shiller indicate the price decline in housing is moderating, but we have
seen false signs of a recovery before.

A New Twist

…on an old theme. The Federal Reserve’s got a new dance and it goes like this. They plan to sell a bunch of the $1 trillion worth of notes they bought
during Quantitative Easing I and QE II. With the proceeds, they will buy a bunch of longer term government bonds. The plan was announced on
September 21st, but was rumored to be in the works since August. The goal is to drive down the spread between yields on long term securities –
those with maturities beyond ten years – and those on shorter dated items. They figure this will stimulate economic activity. (It’s more likely to
stimulate speculative activity and push up the price of “risk” assets like stocks. But the Fed probably would settle for that, too.)

Based on a Federal Reserve study of an earlier twist operation in the early Sixties, they estimated the new twist would narrow the spread by fifteen basis points (the study) or thirty basis points (Chairman Bernanke’s comments in September). The market – ever the efficient discounting mechanism – took the guess work out of these estimates. Between mid-August and the end of September, it narrowed the yield spread between 10- and 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds by forty basis points, helping to spur a huge rally in longer dated bonds.

This occurred even as the year over year increase in core CPI reached 2.0% compared with 0.8% last December. In fact, core inflation has risen every
month this year. The same is largely true if you add back food and energy to get the full inflation picture. The year over year total consumer price
index is up 3.8% through August. These inflation numbers compare with zero yields on money market securities, a 2% yield on ten-year notes, and a 3% yield on thirty year government bonds. Obviously, the goal of Federal Reserve policy is to push investors into riskier assets by creating negative yields in safe securities. They hope such investments will promote stronger economic growth. It might – or it might just create another mini-bubble somewhere.

Still Lost in the Woods

In the last few weeks, there has been some encouraging news. Recent employment data in the U.S. have put to rest fears of a renewed economic
contraction. Based on the number of new hires and hours worked, we’ll probably see 2% GDP growth for the third quarter. In Europe, the French
and Germans have put together a number of plans to keep Greece from defaulting and dragging the European banks with them. One Belgium bank
has been successfully pulled from the brink – even as that meant splitting it apart. When the positives became news, investors flocked to risky
assets – like equities and industrial commodities – and sold safe investments – like U.S. Treasury bonds and the Swiss franc.

Unfortunately, many of the positive developments are rooted in an ever growing mountain of public debt. It remains to be seen whether this is
sustainable either politically or practically. Some reversal of the recent bond price gains is likely before year end and there may be an opportunity
to profit from such market volatility. But any significant rise in long term interest rates will require a turnaround in consumer sentiment and home
prices in the U.S.

Note:  This Market Environment reflects the views of the Investment Advisor only through the date of this report. The Investment Advisor’s views are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. September 30, 2011.