the curious case of Olympus Corporation (JP:7733)

the Olympus story

I have had a nodding acquaintance with Olympus Corp. for a long time.  At one point, I even owned it in one of the portfolios I managed.

I was attracted to the company by its strong market position in endoscopes and its leadership in digital cameras.  But I soon came to the conclusion that Olympus was, at least at that time, pretty set in its ways–resistant to change and not particularly keen to make profits for shareholders from its operations.  So I sold the stock.

The excitement surrounding the recent appointment of Michael Woodford, a foreigner, but a 30-year Olympus employee, as the company’s CEO six months ago suggests that I wasn’t alone in that view.  So too does the 44% plunge in the stock’s price since last Friday, when Mr. Woodford was summarily fired.

According to the Wall Street Journal, soon after Mr. Woodford became a member of the board of Olympus he read a series of  exposés in Japanese magazines about acquisitions Olympus had made in 2006-08.  He was concerned enough to bring in auditor Price Waterhouse to conduct an investigation.   The Financial Times has examined documents provided by Mr. Woodford that he says are copies of the auditors report and his correspondence with other members of the board.

Mr. Woodford has reportedly also related his tale to the anti-fraud authorities in the UK (at least one of the acquisitions was British).  Based on the press reports, the facts seem to come down to this:

–during 2oo6-2008 Olympus made several acquisitions in businesses not directly related either to endoscopes or cameras, spending a total of over $2 billion

–the seller of all the companies bought was a single special purpose vehicle whose owners have not been identified

–Olympus paid inexplicably high investment banking fees–amounting to 50% of the cost of the underlying assets being bought–to a Cayman Islands company that has since disappeared

— in 2009, Olympus wrote down about $1.6 billion of the balance sheet value of the acquisitions.

In a meeting closed to the press, Olympus has apparently denied Mr. Woodford’s allegations and threatened to sue him for disclosing confidential company information.  It says it dismissed him because of his management style.

what to make of this?

Assuming Mr. Woodford’s story is true–and it’s hard to believe he just made this all up–the most benign explanation I can see is that Olympus was the victim of a massive fraud in these acquisitions and covered the whole affair up.   That would square with what I’ve observed over the years as the psychological inability of traditional Japanese managers to confront operating problems or to report anything other than good news to their superiors.

The bigger issue for investors, however, isn’t just Olympus.  It’s how many other asset-rich, performance-poor Japanese firms of the type Western value investors have been attracted to over the years have similar hidden problems.  My guess is that Olympus isn’t alone here.  And no matter how the Olympus case finally plays out, it will certainly not be something that will motivate competent Western corporate turnaround specialists to accept Japanese jobs.

Is the US the new Japan?: stock market implications

the Lost Decades

Today, I’m going to expand on yesterday’s post by writing about features of the “Lost Decades” in Japan that I think might be repeated in similar circumstances elsewhere.

Before I start, however, I want to make two points:

–I don’t think the US is the new “Japan”;  the EU would be a better candidate, in my opinion, based on its behavior toward its banks, its money policy regime and the way many countries intrude into the workings of their equity markets.  But I don’t think it’s anywhere close to being another Japan, either.

Instead, I’m reading the current downdraft in world markets as an adjustment to two realizations:

that economic growth in the US and EU will potentially be much slower in the next two or three years than in 2009-10, and

that no more government support for markets is forthcoming.

The removal of the implicit safety net is the bigger deal, to my mind.  I’ve been thinking–and writing–for a long time that the slow growth/high unemployment problem is a social and political one that won’t affect corporate profits much.  I still think so.

–To (my) Western eyes, the Tokyo stock market was a very peculiar place twenty-odd years ago.  Back then, the government was actively involved in controlling the stock market, in much the same way that governments typically control their bond markets.

For instance:

at times, Japanese brokers were not permitted to accept sell orders for domestic commercial banks–at least from foreigners.

Large amounts of trading were done in specially segregated trusts, to make it clear that the parties were not disrespecting one another by liquidating stockholdings established to cement business relationships. These tokkin “portfolio managers” typically worked in large smoke-filled rooms that housed scores of them, all trading off price movements posted on large electronic “scoreboards” erected along one wall.  No research, no portfolio planning–just trading on hunches or “hot” tips.

Women were legally barred from purchasing warrants (don’t ask me why).

If you want to see something really weird, read my post on tobashi.

Despite these unique quirks, I think there are aspects to the Japanese experience that I think would apply elsewhere.  And, of course, it’s always good to think out alternate scenarios, just in case they become more probable, or because you find your initial assessment was wrong.

Three  factors stand out to me:

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is the US the new Japan?

the question

That’s the question of the day for many stock market commentators.  Most are probably aware that Japan boasted the second largest economy in the world in 1989, and at the same time the world’s largest stock market by far.  The prevailing mood in the US back then was that Japan would soon eclipse us as #1, and we’d be left with selling our armed forces as mercenaries to the rest of the world to get foreign exchange (hard to believe, but true).

Yet, the following two decades saw only economic stagnation for Japan, with its economy long ago surpassed by China and its stock market shrunk to less than a quarter of its relative size.

What went wrong with Japan?

Most of those suggesting the US is starting down the same path don’t have a clue.

To my mind, having watched the Japanese economy and stock market for over 25 years, is that those in power in Japan deliberately chose to preserve the status quo–and the traditional semi-samurai way of life that that implied–over the “creative destruction” that would likely have secured a better economic future.  This stands in stark contrast to the behavior of the prior generation, which rebuilt Japan from the ashes of World War II.

There are parallels between Japan then and the US now.  But there’s already been one major difference in approach.  My guess is that Americans will continue to make substantially different choices than Japan did, but, trite as it is to say, it’s too soon to tell.

the parallels

–The most obvious–and possibly the reason for all the talk–is that both countries have extremely low nominal interest rates, which have failed to turbocharge either economy.

More than that, however,

–Japan experienced a substantial bubble in property and financial assets in the late 1980s, caused by reckless bank lending and regulatory neglect.  (In contrast to the American sub-prime housing bubble, which eventually collapsed under its own weight, the Bank of Japan ended that country’s period of speculative excess by raising interest rates).

–Like most nations, Japan believed in the innate superiority of its way of life.  Japan also believed it received special favor from the divine through the mediation of the emperor.

–The legislature was (and still is) dominated by money politics, with legislators’ influence in the Diet based on their ability to raise funds from special interests.

–Neither major political party had a relevant contemporary social agenda.  The Socialists, now the Democratic Party of Japan, opposed the use of nuclear power and drew their emotional appeal from the WWII bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima.  Oddly, the party also supported North Korea and pachinko parlors.  The anti-nuclear weapons platform later transmuted into anti-nuclear power.  The Liberal Democratic Party, the dominant force over the past 50 years, favored protection of domestic agriculture and policy support for export-oriented manufacturing–in other words, it maintained positions appropriate for Japan only as the developing country is once had been.

differences, so far

–Japan covered up its banking problems for a decade.  The government pressured (successfully) the banks not to call loans made to bankrupt firmsIn fact, it encouraged them to extend more credit, in the vain hope that time would heal what management incompetence, and sometimes corruption, had created.

The propping up of what became known as “zombie” firms had two very negative consequences:

it continued to degrade the financial strength of Japan’s commercial banks, and

it shifted sales away from healthy firms, weakening them as well.

–Through formal and informal means, the government discouraged mergers and acquisitions that would have brought new management into troubled firms. In particular, a series of new laws made it virtually impossible for a foreign firm to take over a domestic one.

–At the time the bubble popped in late 1989, about 10% of Japan’s workforce was employed in the construction industry.–an unusually high proportion for an advanced economy. Rather than attempting to retrain workers (by the way, a task made more difficult by Japan’s kanji-based written language), the Diet chose to launch a continuing series of infrastructure construction programs to keep these workers employed. Later studies seem to show that these projects had no lasting positive effect on the economy. They appear to have served mostly to line the pockets of politically connected companies, raise the national debt and delay the adjustment of the workforce to the new economic realities.

–Throughout this time, Japanese voters, who are generally highly economically sophisticated, remained surprisingly passive. Although the situation is a bit more complicated than this, voters tolerated LDP mismanagement of the economy for twenty years before voting for change. Unfortunately, the DPJ which replaced the LDP has proved as inept today as its predecessor was when it was briefly in power in the late 1980s.

–The Tokyo government snuffed out a nascent economic rebound twice during the Nineties, once by raising interest rates, once by raising taxes.

what about the US?

Will the US make the same errors as Japan? In a narrow sense, it’s too soon to tell. However,

the US has acknowledged its banking problems from the outset.

We can already see substantial merger and acquisition activity underway.

Certainly, “creative destruction” is regarded in a positive light in the US.

Also, I can’t imagine that American voters would be as tolerant of government ineptitude as Japan has been.

The more relevant question will likely be whether the new politicians voted into office will be any better than those voted out.

Tomorrow: stock market implications.


is the rising yen an economic problem?

the current situation

As I’m writing this during afternoon trading on Monday in Tokyo, the yen exchange rate is at US$1 = ¥ 76.8.  That is down a bit from the high of US$1 = ¥ 76.5 the Japanese currency achieved last week.  But it’s still about 1% stronger against the greenback than when Tokyo intervened in the currency markets on August 4th trying to stem the yen’s rise against the dollar.

Notably, in contrast to the coordinated intervention by a group of major industrial countries that occurred after the tragic earthquake/tsunamis of last March, Japan acted alone this time.  The show of solidarity in March was enough to buy the yen a month of relative weakness; the difference of opinion implied in last week’s solitary move meant the Japanese currency gained a mere day of respite.

currency realities

Two of them:

1.  Countries, either alone or in groups, have far less firepower in currency markets than the big international banks.  Add to this the fact that governments typically want to defend politically expedient but economically inappropriate currency levels, and it should come as no surprise that countries stand no chance at all to impose their will on today’s currency markets.

2.  A rising currency acts to slow down economic activity, much in the way an increase in interest rates does.  But it also rearranges growth–away from export-oriented industries and toward domestic ones.  It also reduces the local currency price of imported raw materials.

what about Japan today?

I think it’s important to distinguish between the Japanese economy and the Japanese stock market.

economy

In the case of the former, the most pressing current need is to rebuild the Fukushima area after March’s devastation.  The increased government spending that will make up part of that effort will tend to lift GDP growth, negating at least a portion of the high-yen pressure on economic expansion.  To the degree that local companies use dollar-denominated materials in their rebuilding, their costs will be lower, their profits higher, than they would be in a weak-yen situation. Therefore, yen strength probably won’t be a significant negative for Japan’s economy–and may even be a mild positive.  Today’s announcement in Tokyo of better than expected 2Q11 GDP illustrates this point.  Economic news is likely to continue to be surprisingly positive over at least the coming 12 months.

stock market

The Japanese stock market, on the other hand, is in many ways a monument to Japan’s weak-yen, export-oriented economy past.  In fact, if you were to examine the sectoral structure of the Nikkei without knowing it to be the Tokyo index, you’d guess it to be the benchmark for an emerging economy, not a developed one.  Because this is so, although there will be pockets of strength among Japanese stocks, the index will likely be held back considerably by its high weak-yen component.