Tag Archives: market thoughts

Mexico in the 1980s vs. US today

February 19, 2020 By in capital flight, economic problems in emerging countries, economics, macroeconomics, Strategy, Uncategorized Tags: , , , Leave a comment

bull market = strong economy?

Does stock market strength always mean a booming economy?

The short answer is no.

Mexico in the 1980s

The best illustration I can think of is Mexico in the 1980s.  That economy was a disaster, which played out first of all in the currency markets, where the peso lost 98% of its value vs. the US$ during that decade.  Despite this, in US$ terms the Mexican stock market was hands down the best in the world over the period, far outpacing the S&P 500.

How so?

…a domestic form of capital flight is the short story.

An incompetent and corrupt government in Mexico was spending much more than it was taking in in taxes but was loathe to raise interest rates to defend the peso.  Fearing  currency depreciation triggered by excessive debt, citizens began transferring massive amounts of money abroad, converting their pesos mostly into US$ and either buying property or depositing in a bank.  This added to downward pressure on the peso.  In September 1982 the government instituted capital controls to stem the outflow–basically making it illegal for citizens to convert their pesos into other currencies (Texas, which had been a big beneficiary of the money flow into the US, will remember the negative effect stemming it had).

With that door closed, Mexican savers turned to the national stock market as a way to preserve their wealth.  They avoided domestic-oriented companies that had revenues in pesos.  They especially shunned any with costs in dollars.  They focused instead on gold and silver mines or locally-listed industrial companies that had substantial earnings and assets outside Mexico.  The ideal situation was a multinational firm with revenues in dollars and costs in pesos.

today in the US

To be clear, I don’t think we’re anything close to 1980s Mexico.   But it trying to explain to myself what’s behind the huge divergence in performance between companies wedded to the US economy (bad) and multinational tech (good) I keep coming back to the Mexico experience.  Why?

I don’t see the US economic situation as especially rosy.   Evidently, the stock market doesn’t either.  In tone, administration economic policy looks to me like a reprise of Donald Trump’s disastrous foray into Atlantic City gambling–where he made money personally but where the supporters who financed and trusted him lost their shirts.

What catches my eye:

–tariff and immigration actions are suppressing current growth and discouraging US and foreign firms from building new plant and equipment here

–strong support of fossil fuels plus the roadblocks the administration is trying to create against renewables will likely make domestic companies non-starters in a post-carbon world outside the US.   Look at what similar “protection” did to Detroit’s business in the 1980s.

–threats to deny Chinese companies access to US financial markets and/or the US banking system are accelerating Beijing’s plans to create a digital renminbi alternative to the dollar

–the administration’s denial of access to US-made computer components by Chinese companies will spur creation of a competing business in China–the same way the tariff wars have already opened the door to Brazil in the soybean market, permanently damaging US farmers

–not a permanent issue but one that implies lack of planning:  isn’t it weird to create large tax-cut stimulus but then until it wears off to launch a trade war that will cause contraction?

Then there are Trump’s intangibles–his white racism, his sadism, his constant 1984-ish prevarication, his disdain for honest civil servants, his orange face paint, the simulacrum he appears to inhabit much of the time, the influence of Vladimir Putin…  None of these can be positives, either for stocks or for the country, even though it may not be clear how to quantify them.   (A saving grace may be that the EU can’t seem to get its act together and both China and the UK appear to be governed by Trump clones.)

 

my point?

Two of them:

1.If you were thinking all this, how would you invest your money?

Unlike the case with 1980s Mexico, there’s no foreign stock market destination that’s clearly better.  China through Hong Kong would be my first thought, except that Xi Jinping’s heavy-handed attempt to violate the 1984 handover treaty has deeply damaged the SAR.  So we’re probably limited to US-traded equities.

What to buy?

–multinationals

–that are structural change beneficiaries

–whose main attraction is intellectual property, the rights to which are held outside the US,

–with minimum physical plant and equipment owned inside the US, and

–building new operating infrastructure outside the US, say, across the border in Canada.

As I see it, this is pretty much what’s going on.

 

2.What happens if Mr. Trump is not reelected?

A lot depends on who may take his place.  But it could well mean that we return to a more “normal” economy, where the population increases, so too economic growth, corporate investment in the US resumes, domestic bricks-and-mortar firms do better–and some of the air comes out of the software companies’ stocks.

 

 

more on the new coronavirus

January 27, 2020 By in coronavirus, Current Market Thoughts, Recent Market Action, securities markets, stock market, Uncategorized Tags: , , , 3 Comments

SARS

SARS emerged in China in November 2002.  Local authorities, later removed from office in disgrace, initially failed to sound an alarm about the new disease, apparently thinking reporting it would reflect badly on them and hoping it would just go away if ignored.

The world first became aware of SARS as a public health threat in February 2003.  The disease was declared under control in July 2003.  By that time there had been 8000+ reported cases and about 800 deaths.  The overwhelming majority of the fatalities were in China.  The elderly and the very young were the age groups hardest hit.

the new virus

As of yesterday, there had been 2700+ cases of the new coronavirus reported and 80+ deaths.

There are four differences I see between the SARS epidemic and this year’s outbreak:

–faster reporting and more aggressive quarantining today (the disease is passed through contact with an infected person’s bodily fluids.  There’s no medicine that works against it, so isolating victims is the only “cure”)

–symptoms emerge on average about ten days after infection, pretty much the same as with SARS.   But unlike the case with SARS, where carriers only became infectious after they showed symptoms, carriers of the new virus appear to be infectious from day one, long before they become visibly ill

–China is a much larger part of the world economy today than it was back then.  While the US has grown by 80% (using conventional GDP) since 2003, China is 12x the size it was then.  So the slowdown in global economic activity that will result from quarantine measures in China today will be greater than it was for SARS.  If SARS is a good indicator–and it’s the only one we have, so it is in a sense our best guide–the current outbreak will be well past the worst by mid-year

–SARS happened just as the world was beginning to recover from the recession caused by the internet bubble collapse of early 2000.  The new virus comes during year 11 of recovery from the downturn caused by the near-collapse of the US banking system from losses that piled up during years of wildly speculative lending and securities trading.  In other words, SARS happened when profits were beginning to boom and stocks really wanted to go up; in contrast, this virus is happening when profits are plateauing and stocks want to go sideways mostly because interest rates are crazy low.

investment thoughts

During the SARS outbreak business travel came to a screeching halt because people feared becoming sick/being quarantined in a foreign country. If it’s correct that the new virus can be passed on even before the carrier shows symptoms, the risk in using public transport is substantially greater.  So too the possibility that one’s home country will temporarily bar returnees from virus-infected areas.

Securities markets in China are currently closed for the New Year holiday.  It isn’t clear that they will reopen on schedule.  In the meantime, China-related selling pressure will likely be redirected to markets like New York.  Alibaba (BABA) shares (which I hold), for example, are down about 6% in pre-market trading.  At some point, assuming as I do that the SARS analogy will be a good indicator, there’ll be a buying opportunity.  For me, it’s not today, although if I weren’t a BABA holder I’d probably buy a little.

It will be interesting to see how AI handles trading today.

 

 

the new coronavirus

January 21, 2020 By in coronavirus, Current Market Thoughts, Foreign markets, Uncategorized Tags: , , , Leave a comment

A little more than 17 years ago, the coronavirus SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) surfaced in China.  Despite occurring at what proved to be the onset of a new bull stock market, SARS cast a months-long pall over world stock exchanges, particularly those in Asia and notably Hong Kong.

Two key reasons:  this was the first coronavirus many investors (myself included) had seen, so it was especially scary;  rather than quarantine infected individuals, local authorities in China decided to cover up the presence of the disease, so SARS had a chance to spread unchecked for several months.

 

The coronavirus MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome) only captured world attention for a few days then it emerged in 2012.  Overall economic/stock market conditions were favorable.  Authorities moved quickly to contain its spread.  And investors had already seen how SARS played out.

 

The new coronavirus, which doesn’t have a snappy acronym yet, comes from China and is a relative of SARS.  One might expect that its impact on stock markets will be more like that of MERS than SARS.  Two caveats:  it is hitting China just as the annual New Year travel/spending/celebrating holiday is beginning; and markets have been rising for years.  Economic activity is healthy but not awesome, and is beginning to slow in the US.  Ex Hong Kong and mainland Chinese bourses and travel-related stocks, however, the new virus will be the possible trigger for a selloff, in my view, rather than a cause.

 

Boeing

January 16, 2020 By in Boeing, securities analysis, Uncategorized Tags: , 1 Comment

BA has lost about a quarter of its value since fatal accidents caused its newest 737 model civilain aircraft to be pulled off the market.  Stories are starting to circulate (that I’m hearing them suggests “starting” may not be the best word) that the Sage of Omaha is beginning to buy Boeing (BA) stock.   The rationale?   …a value investor‘s belief that the company’s woes are temporary and that all the probable bad news is already discounted in the stock price.  Buffett has positions in several airline companies and in at least one supplier to BA, so he arguably would have better insight than most into the BA situation.

initial thoughts

How plausible is this?  Is the rumor based on fact or simply launched by a third party with an agenda?  …if the former, is this a repeat of Buffett’s foray into IBM, another questionable trip down memory lane?  what’s BA’s price to book, price to cash flow?  I don’t know.

I’ve never owned BA during 25+ years managing other people’s money.  I’ve never felt a compulsion to investigate it, either, even though I worked for a long time in value-oriented shops where BA was often a topic of discussion.  But I was curious about what interest in BA might not only say about the company but also about the temperature of the market.  So I took a quick look.

I went to the Fidelity research area to get some relevant ratios, in this case the P/CF and P/B.  I found:  $185 billion market cap, P/B of negative $7+ or so a share and P/CF of 30x–not what I would have called a “value” buy.  I decided to take another step and look at BA’s September quarter 10-Q  on the SEC Edgar site.

the latest 10-Q (9/19)

random-ish figures:

–BA has total assets of $133 billion.  Of that $13 billion is plant and equipment, $12 billion is goodwill and other intangible assets and $75 billion is customer financing.  So this is not a plant and equipment story.  It’s about intangible assets, craft skill/ proprietary company know how, being a national champion.

–Book value is negative.  How so?  The most important reason is that over the years BA has spent over $50 billion buying back its own stock, including $1 billion+ during the first nine months of 2019.  Accountants deduct that expenditure from net worth.  Another $15 billion gets subtracted though”comprehensive loss” related to pension plans.  Ex those items, book value would be about $65 billion, meaning the stock is trading at about 3x adjusted book.  Again, not an obvious value story.

–Cash flow, which was about $12 billion during the first three quarters of 2018 is slightly negative for the comparable period of 2019.

my take

The idea behind the typical value stock is that the company has assets that have lost value for now because of economic circumstances or lack of skill of current management.  Once economic conditions improve and/or management is replaced by more competent executives, their value will shine through again.  That’s because the assets haven’t been destroyed, they’ve just been misused.

I don’t think that’s the case here.  The assets in question are intangible.  The strongest, I think, is that BA is one of only two global large commercial aircraft manufacturers–and the only one in the US.  As for the rest, if press reports are correct, BA tried to solve a hardware problem (very heavy engines) with software, a dubious proposition at any time, according to my coder son-in-law.  Worse than that, BA may have been less than forthcoming with regulators about potential risks with this solution.  As for myself, I’d go to considerable pains to avoid flying on a 737 MAX, given that the penalty for a mistake is so high.

So I don’t get bullishness about BA for two reasons:  I think intangibles like craft skill and industrial software can melt away in short order in the way, say, a chemical processing plant can’t.  Also, given what I think is the severity of BA’s problems, I don’t think a loss of a quarter of the company’s stock market value is an overreaction.  If anything, I think it’s an underreaction.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

thinking about 2020

January 3, 2020 By in bond market, Current Market Thoughts, Foreign markets, major changes in market direction, Recent Market Action, securities markets, stock market, Strategy, Uncategorized Tags: , , 1 Comment

where we are

The S&P 500 is trading at around 25x current earnings, up from a PE of 20x a year ago.  Multiple expansion, not earnings growth, is the key factor behind the S&P rise last year.In fact, earnings per share growth, now at about +10%/year, has been decelerating since the one-time boost from the domestic corporate income tax cut cycled through income statements in 2018.  Typically earnings deceleration is a red flag.  Not so in 2019.

EPS growth in 2020 will probably be around +10% again.

About half the earnings of the S&P come from the US, a quarter from Europe and the rest from emerging economies.  The US will likely be the weakest of the three areas this year, as ongoing tariff wars take a further toll on agriculture and manufacturing, as population growth continues to wane given the administration’s hostility toward foreigners, and as multinationals continue to shift operations elsewhere to escape these policies.  On the other hand, Europe ex the UK should perk up a bit, emerging markets arguably can’t get much worse, and multinationals will likely invest more abroad.

 

interest rates:  the biggest question 

What motivated investors to bid up the S&P by 30% last year despite pedestrian eps growth and Washington dysfunction?

Investors don’t buy stocks in a vacuum.  We’re constantly comparing stocks with bonds and cash as alternative liquid investments.  And in 2019 bonds and cash were distinctly unattractive.   The yield on cash is close to zero here (elsewhere in the world bank depositors have been charged for holding cash).  The 10-year Treasury started 2019 yielding 2.66%.  The yield dipped to 1.52% during the summer and has risen to 1.92% now.  In contrast, the earnings yield (1/PE, the academic point of comparison of stocks vs. bonds)) on the S&P was 5% last January and is 4% now.

The dividend yield on the S&P is now about 1.9%.  That’s higher than the 10-year yield, a situation that has occurred in our lifetimes only after a bear market has crushed stock valuations.  In my working career, this has happened mostly outside the US and has always been a clear buy signal for stocks.  Not now, though–in my view–unless we’re willing to believe that the current situation is permanent.

The situation is even stranger outside the US, where the yield on many government bonds is actually negative.

In short, wild distortions in sovereign bond markets, a product of unconventional central bank measures aimed at rescuing the world economy after the 2008-09 collapse, have migrated into stocks.

How long will this situation last and how will it unwind?

 

more on Monday